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ABSTRACT
Fault Detection and Isolation In Gas Turbine Engines
Zakieh Sadough
Aircraft engines are complex systems that require high reliability and adequate monitoring to
ensure ﬂight safety and performance. Moreover, timely maintenance has necessitated the need
for intelligent capabilities and functionalities for detection and diagnosis of anomalies and
faults. In this thesis, fault diagnosis in aircraft jet engines is investigated by using intelligent-
based methodologies. Two different artiﬁcial neural network schemes are introduced for this
purpose. The ﬁrst fault detection and isolation (FDI) scheme for an aircraft jet engine is based
on the multiple model approach and utilizes dynamic neural networks (DNN). Towards this
end, multiple DNNs are constructed to learn the nonlinear dynamics of the aircraft jet engine.
Each DNN represents a speciﬁc operating mode of the healthy or the faulty conditions of the
jet engine.
The inherent challenges in fault diagnosis systems is that their performance could be
excessively reduced under sensor fault and sensor degradation conditions (such as drift and
noise). This thesis proposes the use of data validation and sensor fault detection to improve
the performance of the overall fault diagnosis system. In this regard the concept of nonlinear
principle components analysis (NPCA) is exploited by using autoassociative neural networks.
The second FDI scheme is developed by using autoassociative neural networks (ANN).
iii
A parallel bank of ANNs are proposed to diagnose sensor faults as well as component faults
in the aircraft jet engine. Unlike most FDI techniques, the proposed solution simultaneously
accomplishes sensor faults and component faults detection and isolation (FDI) within a uniﬁed
diagnostic framework.
In both proposed FDI approaches, by using the residuals that are generated from the
difference between each network output and the measured jet engine output as well as selec-
tion of a proper threshold for each network, criteria are established for performing the fault
diagnosis of the jet engines. The fault diagnosis tasks consists of determining the time as well
as the location of a fault occurrence subject to the presence of disturbances and measurement
noise. Simulation results presented, demonstrate and illustrate the effective performance of
our proposed neural network-based FDI strategies.
iv
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Modern complex systems require high precision and reliable performance due to the
criticality and complexity. Fault diagnosis is essential for attaining such a high reliability in
safety critical systems. In general, fault diagnosis is a process (or a technique) to detect the
presence of faults and to determine their locations and to estimate their signiﬁcance or sever-
ities in a system that is being monitored. The goal of fault detection and isolation system
is to improve the reliability, availability and safety. Traditionally, redundancy and therefore
fault diagnosis is achieved by using extra hardware, which is known as hardware redundancy
approach to fault diagnosis. In this approach, multiple critical components such as an actuator
or a sensor is used to control or measure a particular variable in the system. Typically, a voting
technique is applied to the hardware redundant system to decide if a fault has occurred and
the location of the component among all the redundant system parts. The major problems
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encountered with hardware redundancy is that the increase in sensors leads to an increase in
cost, weight, and complexity [2]. Consequently, another approach for generating redundancy
known as the analytical redundancy was introduced in early 1970’s by Beard [9]. Analyti-
cal redundancy, by contrast, eliminates the need for additional instrumentation hardware. In
Figure 1.1, the hardware and analytical redundancy concepts are illustrated.
The analytical FDI approach can take a variety of forms including ordinary differential
equations, intelligent data-driven models, and expert system models. Therefore, analytical
redundancy-based fault diagnosis can generally be applied in three distinct frameworks based
on the way the knowledge about the system is utilized. The ﬁrst one is the mathematical
model-based framework [2], [10–13], where a priori knowledge of the system is represented
by the system’s mathematical model derived by using physical principles. The second one
is the learning-based or computational intelligence-based framework [14, 15] which utilizes
system’s historical data and data-driven models of the system. References [16, 17] provide
comparison of various methods within the above two frameworks. Finally, the third frame-
work includes the expert system-based or fuzzy rule-based approaches to fault detection and
isolation (FDI) [18, 19], which use an expert’s knowledge of the system operation and its
failure modes to obtain a qualitative model of the system.
The analytical redundancy-based FDI, in general, consists of two main stages namely,
residual generation and residual evaluation (or decision making), as shown in Figure 1.2. The
residual generation process is based on comparison between the measured and the estimated
2
Figure 1.1: Analytical versus hardware redundancy based FDI [1].
3
system outputs, the resulting differences generated between the measured signals and the cor-
responding estimated signals obtained from the model is called a residual signal. The residual
signal is expected to stay close to zero when no fault is present (normal operation) in the
system, but should distinguishably diverge from the zero neighbourhood when a fault occurs.
This property of the residual is used to determine whether or not faults are presented and
occurred.
In the residual evaluation stage, on the other hand, the generated residuals are inspected
for the likelihood of faults by analyzing the residual signal. The fault presence is determined
by applying a decision rule. The decision rule may simply be a threshold test on the instan-
taneous values or the moving window averages of the residuals, or it may consists of more
complex statistical approaches such as, likelihood ratio testing or sequential probability ratio
testing [20, 21].
Figure 1.2: Schematic of a fault diagnosis approach [2].
4
1.1 Motivation of the Work
In this thesis the problem of fault diagnosis in aircraft jet engines is addressed by using
intelligent-based methods. Fault diagnosis, that is the problem of fault detection and isola-
tion (FDI), of aircraft jet engine has been a matter of wide interest in recent years due to the
increasing demand and requirements on reliable operations and maintainability of these safety
critical systems. Engine related costs comprise a large portion of the direct operating cost of
an aircraft, particularly due to the overall maintenance costs of the propulsion system in air-
craft. Fault diagnosis technologies allow one to avoid heavy economic losses due to stopped
or aborted ﬂights as well as the cost associated with untimely and unnecessary replacement of
the components and parts. On the other hand, an early diagnosis of faults and anomalies in
an engine makes it possible to perform important condition-based maintenance decisions and
actions as opposed to conventional time-based maintenance actions.
The removal of noise and outliers from measurement signals is a major problem in jet
engine fault diagnosis systems. The effectiveness and reliability of the FDI system is strongly
limited by measurement uncertainties. Sensor measurements are the ﬁrst essential factors
needed for monitoring operating conditions of a jet engine to establish the fault diagnosis and
performance analysis. The above mentioned facts, calls for the necessity of validating the
quality of the measurement data prior to be used for health monitoring.
Sensor fault diagnosis is another point of investigation on engine performance evalua-
tion. Indeed, before the measurements can be used for engine condition assessment, it must
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be ensured that they correctly represent the measured physical quantities, namely that the
corresponding sensor readings do not contain a fault such as bias or drift. Diagnostic tools al-
lowing sensor fault detection are thus necessary and must be efﬁcient specially in cases when
component faults occur.
1.2 Literature Review on Fault Diagnosis
In the problem of jet engine fault diagnosis one utilizes knowledge on the measured variables
taken along the engine’s gas path to determine how an engine system performance differs
from its desired state. Changes in the engine speeds, temperatures, pressures, fuel ﬂows, etc.,
derive the required information for identifying the engine system malfunctions. Using such
characteristics the most popular diagnosis procedure has appeared in the literature as the so-
called Gas Path Analysis (GPA).
As expressed above the goal of GPA is to detect physical faults that consist of variety
of problems or combinations of anomalies and factors such as foreign object damage (FOD),
blade erosion and corrosion, worn seals, excess clearance or plugged nozzles, etc. Such physi-
cal faults cause changes in the thermodynamic performance of the engine and the components.
The condition of the components can be mathematically represented by a set of independent
performance parameters. The performance parameters that are mostly investigated in the lit-
erature are component efﬁciencies and ﬂow capacities.
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Figure 1.3 shows the GPA’s main concepts [3]. In general, the fundamental idea un-
derlying this approach is that physical faults occurring in the engine cause a change in the
component performance as introduced by efﬁciencies and ﬂow capacities which in turn pro-
duce observable changes in measurable parameters such as the temperature, pressure, speed,
etc. If changes are then observed in the gas path measurements, the problem would be in
detecting the fault and evaluating which module or thermodynamic parameter or components
parameters are responsible for that change. This itself may assist for the prospective isolation
of the physical faults.
A large number of methodologies have been proposed in the literature for GPA. Some of
these are Kalman ﬁlter approaches [6,7,22,23], neural networks [24,25], fuzzy logic [26,27],
probabalistic networks [28], genetic algorithms [29], and hybrid diagnosis [30].
Figure 1.3: GPA principle [3].
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1.2.1 Fault Diagnosis
A fault refers to unpredicted or unexpected deviation or change in a system’s behaviour from
that desired, for a bounded or unbounded period of time. The overall goals of the jet engine di-
agnostic system are to correctly detect, isolate and identify the changes in the engine modules.
In other words, a fault diagnosis system is capable of performing the three tasks of detection,
isolation, and identiﬁcation of faults in a system, which are deﬁned as follows [2]:
Fault detection: To make a binary decision whether something has gone wrong or that ev-
erything is ﬁne.
Fault isolation: To determine the location of the fault, i.e., to identify which component,
sensor, or actuator has become faulty.
Fault identiﬁcation To estimate the severity, type or nature of the fault.
Fault diagnosis algorithms are mainly divided into two categories, namely model-based
and data-driven (computational intelligent-based) techniques. Both model-based and data-
driven techniques have been extensively studied in the literature for health monitoring of air-
craft jet engines. Some of the important survey papers in the ﬁeld of model-based FDI include
Betta and Pietrosanto [31], Frank [32], Venkatasubramanian [33], [34], Isermann [10] and
Marinai [35]. In recent model-based approaches, the observer based methods and Kalman ﬁl-
ters are quite popular [6,7,23]. Although, such model-based techniques have their advantages
in terms of on-board implementations, their reliability for health monitoring often decreases
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as the system nonlinear complexities and modelling uncertainties increase. The inherent non-
linearity of gas-turbine performance and diagnosis relationships as well as the limitations of
the analytical model-based technique, makes the need for the application of an alternative
computational technique, such as employing neural networks even more essential.
Artiﬁcial Neural Networks
Data-driven approaches such as those based on neural networks mostly rely on real-time or
collected historical data from sensors and do not require a detailed mathematical model of the
system [32,36–40]. Neural networks are promising tools for fault diagnosis due to their proven
success in system identiﬁcation and strong capability in learning nonlinear transformations
that map a set of inputs to a set of outputs. Examples of works published in the ﬁeld of
NN-based FDI schemes include [41–45].
Applications of neural networks to engine fault diagnosis have been widely developed
and discussed in the literature. Zedda and Singh [46] have proposed the use of a modular-
based diagnosis system for a dual spool turbofan gas turbine. Multiple neural networks are
proposed in [47] for fault diagnosis of a single shaft gas turbine. The authors in [48] have
further extended multiple neural networks method to generate a cascaded network to isolate
component and sensor faults. Green [39] have discussed the need to incorporate a neural
network with other AI techniques to perform the estimates of the active life, diagnostics and
prognostics capabilities for the engine. Romessis et al. [49] have applied a probabilistic neural
9
network (PNN) to diagnose faults and investigate the diagnostic capability of the PNN on tur-
bofan engines. Volponi et al. [25] introduced a hybrid neural network where part of the model
was replaced by inﬂuence coefﬁcients. They reported that the accuracy of such a network was
favourably compared with a backpropagation network and Kalman ﬁlter approach.
Dynamic Neural Networks
It has been shown in the literature that multi-layer perceptron networks (MLP) can be used as
universal approximator for static nonlinearities and are capable of identifying any nonlinear
unique static function [4]. In recent years several approaches have been suggested in the liter-
ature that incorporate dynamics to artiﬁcial neural networks due to the need for identiﬁcation
of dynamical systems. Patton et al. [50] have outlined artiﬁcial intelligence approaches to
fault diagnosis of dynamic systems. Some of the most applied neural network structures for
fault diagnosis in dynamical systems are, recurrent neural networks [51], time-delay neural
networks (TDNN) [52] and dynamic neural networks (DNN) [4, 53].
In recurrent or time delayed networks, the network is fed with current or delayed values
of the process inputs and outputs. They count as quasi dynamical models, since the neural
network used in the structure remains a static approximator. On the other hand, the dynamic
networks have dynamic elements within their structure. Therefore, they provides a viable tool
for dealing with nonlinear problems and modeling complex and nonlinear dynamical systems
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with great ﬂexibility and capability. Dynamic multilayer perceptrons or dynamic neural net-
works have recently been applied and utilized for system identiﬁcation problems due to their
capabilities in modelling nonlinear dynamical systems. Such networks have a feedforward
multilayer architecture and their dynamic properties are achieved by using dynamic neurons.
Each neuron by itself possesses dynamic characteristics that is constructed through a locally
recurrent globally feedforward (LRGF) scheme [4, 53].
Recently, dynamic neural networks have been utilized for fault diagnosis of nonlinear
systems. The authors in [40] have used a multilayer perceptron network embedded with dy-
namic neurons for fault detection and isolation (FDI) of thrusters in the formation ﬂight of
satellites. A dynamic neural network is constructed in [54] for accomplishing the fault detec-
tion task, and a static neural classiﬁer is then used based on the learning vector quantization
(LVQ) for the fault isolation task. The authors in [8] have applied dynamic neural networks
that was developed in [53] for fault detection of aircraft jet engines.
1.2.2 Data Validation
Gas turbine performance analysis make use of measurements (such as gas path temperatures,
gas path pressures and rotational speeds) to recognize the poorly performing engine and to
isolate and identify the cause of the deﬁciencies or faults. As all fault diagnosis systems require
correct sensor measurements, unreliable sensors can cause the system to move the diagnosis in
an erroneous direction. Therefore, data validation of sensor measurements and correcting data
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from sensors is a prerequisite in applying fault diagnosis techniques. Traditional approaches
to sensor validation involve periodic instrument calibration. These calibration processes are
expensive. Many periodic sensor calibration techniques require the process shut down, the
instrument taken out of service, and the instrument loaded and calibrated. This method can
lead to damaged equipment, incorrect calibrations due to adjustments made under non-service
conditions, and loss of product due to unnecessarily shutting down a process [55].
Several approaches have been used for sensor data validation. For example, analytical
redundancy using an on-line nonlinear model of a turbo fan engine is proposed in [56] to pro-
vide estimates for failed sensors. The reference [57] has proposed unknown input observer as
a robust sensor and actuator fault detection, isolation, and accommodation techniques. The
usual approach to deal with measurements uncertainty is to use techniques based on Kalman
ﬁlter (KF), which should be able to estimate engine performance parameters and measure-
ment biases in the presence of noise [58, 59]. However, Kalman ﬁlter based estimation tech-
niques are affected by several drawbacks, resulting in inaccuracy and lack of reliability [56].
In general, using model-based methods one always encounters uncertainties as the system
complexity increases. In this thesis, autoassociative neural networks is used by incorporating
nonlinear principal component analysis (NPCA) concept to detect, identify and reconstruct
faulty sensors in gas turbine engine.
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1.2.3 Sensor Fault Detection
Sensors are basically the output interface of a system to the external world, and convey in-
formation about a system’s behaviour and internal states. Therefore, sensor faults may cause
substantial performance degradation of all decision-making systems or processes that depend
on data integrity for making decisions. Such systems include, but not limited to, feedback con-
trol systems, safety control systems, quality control systems, navigation systems, surveillance
and reconnaissance systems, state estimation systems, optimization systems, and interestingly
health monitoring and fault diagnosis systems [1].
Common sensor faults/failures include: (a) bias; (b) drift; (c) performance degradation
(or loss of accuracy); (d) sensor freezing; and (e) calibration error [60]. Figure 1.4 depicts the
effect of the above faults on system measurements.
The design of sensor fault diagnosis schemes using the hardware redundancy and an-
alytical redundancy approaches have been addressed in the literature [61]. In the hardware
redundancy approach, redundant sensor systems are incorporated into the control system to
improve the reliability of sensor measurements and enable sensor fault detection. However,
cost and space make this approach unattractive. In contrast, the analytical redundancy-based
fault-diagnosis architectures use system physics based models and information processing
methods to achieve the necessary redundancy.
In the literature, both data-driven and model-based approaches have been proposed to
diagnose different sensor faults. The majority of model-based sensor fault diagnosis schemes
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Figure 1.4: The impact of various sensor faults on system measurements [1]
rely on linear time-invariant (LTI) models [62] which can be considered as the major chal-
lenge. Unfortunately, in nonlinear, time-varying systems, LTI models can sometimes fail to
give satisfactory results. As an alternative there has been a growing interest in the use of
adaptive neural networks (NNs) as nonlinear system approximators [36].
There are also several sensor fault diagnosis schemes that are proposed in the litera-
ture, which are speciﬁcally designed to detect multiple sensor faults. These include the dedi-
cated observer scheme (DOS) (Clark [63]), generalised observer scheme (GOS) (Frank [32]),
multiple model Kalman ﬁlter (MMKF) (Willsky et al. [20]) and the multi-layer perceptron
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(MLP)-NN based SFDIA scheme proposed in [64].
In spite of the popularity of model-based approaches in fault detection, this is challeng-
ing and sometimes inappropriate method for sensor fault detection. This is due to the fact that
most model-based approaches are designed at a nominal health condition and rely on the cor-
rect input data in general [65]. It assumes that the input to the real system and the input to the
model are correct (fault free). Any observed deviation (due to any faults related to the actuator,
sensor or components) in the engine outputs from their reference condition values indicates
the presence of a fault. This makes the sensor fault detection unreliable and challenging.
Sensor fault detection isolation and accommodation (SFDIA) via neural networks have
been proposed over the years due to their nonlinear structures, online learning capabilities and
no needs for explicit mathematical model [62,66–71]. Comparison between Kalman ﬁlter and
neural network approaches for sensor validation or fault detectionis provided in [72].
Autoassociative neural networks (ANNs) have been used extensively in the recent past
few years as a solution in sensor fault detection and identiﬁcation. Hines and Uhrig [55]
applied the ANN method to detect faulty sensors. The author in [73] proposes a sensor fault
detection and repair method based on Autoassociative neural network to detect multi-faulty
transducers of an IEEE 1451 based intelligent sensor, synchronously, through a well-trained
ANN. The reference [74] identiﬁed a single fault sensor using an enhanced ANN and the
exact value of the fault sensor was reconstructed. The rationale for the use of ANN in sensor
fault detection is their capacity to provide a robust identity mapping between the input and the
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output of the network, which could be exploited in sensor fault detection. In Chapter 5 we
have also shown how the ANN can be exploited for engine fault diagnosis as well.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
In this thesis, our goal is to develop novel solutions for the problem of aircraft jet engine com-
ponents and sensor fault detection and isolation based on artiﬁcial neural network approaches.
Towards this end, two different neural network-based schemes are proposed which each pos-
sess noble features. The contributions of this thesis in solving the above problem is listed as
follows:
First, a multiple model dynamic neural network-based scheme for component fault de-
tection and isolation is proposed which makes use of both the beneﬁts of multiple model
characteristics and the advantages of artiﬁcial neural networks. On the other hand, the dy-
namic neural networks used in this scheme are an ideal tool in identifying nonlinear dynamic
systems under different operating modes. Indeed, unlike the approaches in the literature which
use static neural network, dynamic neural network renders it possible to develop a single non-
linear neural network for a range of operating conditions. The developed neural network-based
multiple model is applied to the aircraft jet engine.
Second, knowing the fact that using the validated and qualiﬁed data enhances the relia-
bility of the FDI system, an intelligent-based approach using autoassociative neural networks
is developed for validation and qualiﬁcation of the jet engine data.
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Third most of the standard approaches in the literature are proposed for either sensor
fault detection or system fault detection or they incorporate either two or three separate subsys-
tems to accomplish the tasks of fault diagnosis in both sensors and components. Consequently,
both FDI systems need to be active in order to isolate the sensor faults from the system faults.
As a novel approach, we developed an integrated diagnostic approach that simultaneously di-
agnose and isolate both the sensor faults and component faults. In our framework we also
propose a criterion to investigate the residuals that are obtained from the difference between
each neural network-based model outputs and the measured jet engine outputs in order to iso-
late the sensor faults and component faults. Using our approach fast and accurate detection
and isolation of both sensor and component faults can be obtained. In addition, in the event of
a failed sensor the scheme is capable of replacing the faulty sensor value with the virtual true
sensor value. The scheme is extremely robust to measurement noise and it can very reliably
and accurately perform FDI, even in presence of large measurement noise.
The capabilities of our proposed dynamic neural network-based FDI approach and au-
toassociative neural network-based sensor and component fault diagnosis approach are demon-
strated under different fault scenarios. Finally, the two proposed fault diagnosis approaches




The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we brieﬂy review the back-
ground material which will be used in the following chapters. We review the structure of
the two proposed artiﬁcial neural networks namely dynamic neural networks and autoassocia-
tive neural networks. We also review the nonlinear mathematical modelling of the aircraft jet
engine that is used in this work. In Chapter 3, our fault detection and isolation (FDI) method-
ology using dynamic neural networks is proposed along with the simulation results showing
the effectiveness of our approach. The results of applying the autoassociative neural networks
for data validation in the jet engine output variables are presented in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5,
our proposed integrated sensor and component fault diagnosis scheme is described in detail.
Finally, concluding remarks and future work are included in Chapter 6.
Some of the results of this research have already been published in the following con-
ference and journal:
[1] S. Sina Tayarani Bathaie, Z. Sadough and K. Khorasani, “Fault Detection of Gas
Turbine Engines using Dynamic Neural Networks”, IEEE Canadian Conference on Electrical
and Computer Engineering , Montreal, Quebec, April, 2012.
[2] S. Sina Tayarani Bathaie, Z. Sadough and K. Khorasani, “Dynamic Neural Network-





In this chapter, we present an overview of the background material related to our work. In this
thesis we have studied fault diagnosis of aircraft jet engines using neural network methodolo-
gies. In this chapter, we introduce two different neural networks and provide the aircraft jet
engine model to which our fault diagnosis methodologies are applied to. We ﬁrst describe and
introduce dynamic neural networks (DNN) as an efﬁcient tool for nonlinear dynamic systems
identiﬁcation. The DNN is later used in Chapters 3 and 4 for engine components fault diag-
nosis. Next, we introduce autoassociative neural networks which will later be used for data
validation and fault diagnosis in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, we brieﬂy describe the
nonlinear mathematical model of a dual spool jet engine that is used to develop a SIMULINK
model of the system for data generation and neural network training and validation.
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2.1 Dynamic Neural Networks (DNNs)
Dynamic multilayer perceptrons or dynamic neural networks (DNNs) have recently been ap-
plied and utilized for dynamic system identiﬁcation problems due to their capabilities in mod-
elling nonlinear dynamical systems. Such networks have the feedforward multilayer archi-
tecture and their dynamic properties are obtained by using dynamic neurons. Each neuron
by itself possesses dynamic characteristics which can lead to constructing a locally recurrent
globally feedforward (LRGF) network. This kind of structure allows one to design an effective
feedforward multilayer network that both has dynamic characteristics and has less complexity
than time-delay and recurrent networks which use a global feedback in their structures [4,53].
Dynamic neural networks presented in [4] and [53] have a great capability in learning the
dynamics of complicated nonlinear systems where conventional static neural networks cannot
yield an acceptable modeling performance. Dynamic neural networks or dynamic multilayer
perceptron networks (MLP) represent an extension of static neural networks by including
discrete or continuous time dynamics to the neuron model. Such an extension enhances the
capability of the resulting neural network to approximate not only the static nonlinearities of
the system but also its dynamic nonlinearities. The dynamic neuron model and the dynamic
neural network architecture are presented in the following subsections.
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2.1.1 Dynamic Neuron Model
A dynamic neuron model [4] is constructed by adding internal dynamics and by making the
neuron’s activity dependent on its internal states. This can be achieved by integrating an
Inﬁnite Impulse Response (IIR) ﬁlter within the standard static perceptron structure. Figure
2.1, represents the structure of such a dynamic neuron model. Three main modules are used






where W= [w1w2...wP]T denotes the input-weight vector, P denotes the number of inputs, and
u(k) = [u1(k)u2(k)...uP(k)]T is the input vector (T denotes the transpose operator). The output
of the adder is passed through the IIR ﬁlter (H(q−1)) through which a dynamic mapping is
then generated between the input and the output of the neuron. Applying an nth order ﬁlter,
the output of the ﬁlter and the ﬁlter transfer function are given by


















where x(k) denotes the ﬁlter input, y˜(k) denotes the ﬁlter output, a = [a1,a2, ...,an]T and
b= [b0,b1,b2, ...,bn]T are the numerator and the denominator coefﬁcients of the ﬁlter transfer
function (feedback and feedforward ﬁlter parameters) and q is the time shift operator. There-
fore, the neuron output can be expressed as:
y(k) = F(g.y˜(k)) (2.5)
where F(.) is a nonlinear activation function that produces the neuron output and g is the slope
of the activation function.
Figure 2.1: A dynamic neuron having an internal IIR ﬁlter [4].
In many cases time delays exist between inputs and outputs. For the systems that con-
tain time delays and when these are considerable for the system performance and cannot be











In order to use such a modiﬁcation, one needs the delayed inputs x(k− i− nk) and the
parameter nk which can be determined arbitarily or by using optimization procedure [75].
2.1.2 Dynamic Neural Network Architecture
Let us consider an L-layered network as shown in Figure 2.2 using dynamic neurons that are
described by a differentiable activation function F(.). Let Nl denote the number of neurons in
the l-th layer, Oln(k) denote the output of the nth neuron of the lth layer, and u
l
p(k) denote the
input of the lth layer, generated from the p-th neuron of the previous layer at discrete times
k (l = 1, ...,L; n = 1, ...,Nl). It can be shown [76] that the output of the nth neuron in the lth
layer is given by



















It can be seen from equation (2.7) that the network outputs depend on the past outputs
y˜(k− 1), y˜(k− 2), ..., y˜(k− n). Since it is assumed that the activation function F(.) is an
invertible function (e.g. tangent hyperbolic), then network outputs will also depend on the
past outputs y(k− 1), y(k− 2), ... , y(k− n). Consequently, the expression for the last layer
outputs is given by equation (2.8), where Γ(.) is a nonlinear function. This illustrates that the
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network outputs are nonlinear functions of the inputs and their delays as well as the previous
output samples, that is
OLn(k) = Γ[y(k−1), ...,y(k−ms),u(k),u(k−1), ..,u(k−ns)] (2.8)
The main objective of the neural network learning process is to adjust all the unknown
network parameters so that the nonlinear jet engine system can be identiﬁed by the proposed
dynamic neural network by using a given training set of input-output data pairs. The unknown
network parameters are denoted by w, a, b, g, where w= [wlnp]l=1,...,L;n=1,...,Nl ;p=1,...,Nl−1 is the
weight matrix, a = [aldn]l=1,...,L;n=1,...,Nl ;d=1,...,D and b = [b
l
dn]l=1,...,L;n=1,...,Nl ;d=1,...,D are the
ﬁlter parameters matrices, where D denotes the order of the ﬁlter, and g= [gln]l=1,...,L;n=1,...,Nl
denotes the slope parameter matrix.
Figure 2.2: Dynamic neural network architecture.
To adjust the network parameters, pairs of healthy input and output data sets are used.
The backpropagation error is widely applied for the purpose of training static networks. Its
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extension to dynamic applications is known as the extended dynamic backpropagation algo-
rithm [76].
2.1.3 Extended Dynamic Backpropagation Algorithm
In both static and dynamic neural networks, the objective is to determine an adaptive algorithm
or a rule which adjusts the parameters of the network based on a given set of input-output pairs.
The idea of the error backpropagation is widely applied for this purpose in static contexts and
has extension to dynamic systems. To deﬁne an extended dynamic backpropagation (EDBP)
algorithm, the standard approach can be applied. Assuming that the unknown parameter vec-
tors w, a, b, g are considered as elements of a parameter vector v, the learning process involves
the determination of the vector v∗ which minimizes the performance index Jv(k) according to
the error function e(k):
Jv =
e(k)2 =yd(k)− y(k)2 (2.9)
where yd(k) denotes the desired output of the network and y(k) denotes the actual response of
the network on the given input pattern u(k) [76] .
The adjustment of the parameters of the sth neuron in the mth layer according to the
EDBP algorithm in a M-layered network has the form,








where v = [w,a,b,g] represents the unknown generalized parameter vector, η is the learning
rate, δms is the generalized output error which is described below for both hidden and out-
put layers (equation (2.11)), and Smvs denotes the sensitivity function for the elements of the

















s (k)) for m = 1, ..., M - 1
(2.11)
where F(.) is a nonlinear activation function that produces the neuron output as described in
equation 2.5.
The sensitivity function Smvs(k) for the elements of the unknown generalized parameter
v is deﬁned as follows:
1. Sensitivity with respect to the feedback parameter amis:
Smais(k) =−gms y˜ms (k− i) (2.12)





s (k− i) (2.13)
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2.2 Autoassociative Neural Networks
Autoassociative neural networks [77] are feedforward neural networks that are used to ac-
quire input-output models by using backpropagation training or similar learning procedures.
In autoassociative neural networks the function to be learned is the identity mapping between
network inputs and outputs, implying that the outputs are an approximation of the inputs. By
selecting a proper internal architecture and training the network to learn the identity mapping,
the autoassociative neural networks can carry out several useful data screening tasks such as
reducing the measurements noise. In addition, by constructing the residuals from the differ-
ence of the inputs and outputs of the network, they can be used to detect sensor faults as well
as the missing and faulty sensor data can be estimated.
Autoassociative networks are different from networks that implement associative mem-
ory even though both are used to treat noisy and corrupted data. Autoassociative neural
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networks perform functional mappings while associative memories are basically classiﬁers,
recalling a stored typical examples that most closely resembles a partial or corrupted input
patterns. In bidirectional associative memory networks [78] the output is a stored pattern as-
sociated with the classiﬁcation of the input. Therefore, the number of possible responses from
the associative memory is ﬁnite, and for any input one of the pre-stored patterns is recalled. In
contrast, the autoassociative network has no discrete classes and its outputs can be continuous
variables.
2.3 Autoassociative Neural Network (ANN) Structure
The general structure of an autoassociative neural network (ANN) as shown in Figure 2.3,
contains three hidden layers. The ﬁrst hidden layer is called the mapping layer. The activation
function of the mapping layer can be sigmoidal, tangent hyperbolic or any other similar non-
linearity. The second hidden layer is called the bottleneck layer and can have linear transfer
functions. The dimension of the bottleneck layer should be smaller than the dimension of the
other hidden layers. The third hidden layer is called the demapping layer and has the same
activation function as the mapping layer. The mapping and the demapping layers have the
same dimension.
The bottleneck layer output is the compressed representation of the data given in the
input layer. If the inputs are a set of observations of correlated variables, the mapping layer
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Figure 2.3: Architecture of autoassociative neural network where σ denotes sigmoidal nodes
and l indicates linear nodes.
converts these sets of correlated observations into a set of uncorrelated variables. The autoas-
sociative neural network is derived from the concept of principle components analysis which
is applicable to both linear and nonlinear correlations among variables. The output of the
nodes in the bottleneck layer can be viewed as principle components as compact represen-
tation of the inputs. Same as the principle component analysis, the goal of the ANN in the
bottleneck layer is to compress the data into a set of new variables in new space with lower
dimensionality so that the data can be described as concisely as possible. An important issue
regarding ANN is that it can deal with linear and nonlinear correlations among the variables
and produce a compact and concise data representation.
The use of a structure with three hidden layers as opposed to one hidden layer is due
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to the need for data compression inside the network in order to ﬁlter out both noise and bi-
ases. According to the Figure 2.3, the autoassociative network should be viewed as a cascade
combination of two single-hidden layer networks. The input, the mapping and the bottleneck
layers together represent a nonlinear function G :Rm →Rf which projects the inputs to a lower
dimensional space designated as the feature space. This mapping has the following form
T=G(Y) (2.16)
where G is a nonlinear vector function, composed of f individual nonlinear functions (G =
[G1,G2, ...,Gf ]T ). Let Ti denotes the output of the ith bottleneck node or the ith element of
T = [T1,T2, ...,Tf ], i = 1, ..., f , and Y = [Y1,Y2...,Ym]T denotes the network input. Therefore,
the map is described according to Gi : Rm → R which has the form
Ti = Gi(Y ), i= 1, ..., f (2.17)
For the inverse transformation (restoring the original dimensionality of the data), the bottle-
neck layer output, the demapping layer and the output layer represent a second network that
is modelled as a nonlinear function H : Rf → Rm, which reproduces an approximation to the




where H is a nonlinear vector function composed of m individual nonlinear functions (H =
[H1,H2, ...,Hm]T ). Each output can be described according to Hj : Rf → R, such that
Ŷj = Hj(T ), j = 1, ...,m (2.19)
For sake of generality, the subnets representing G and H functions must each be capable of
representing nonlinear functions of arbitrary nature. This can be achieved by providing each
subnetwork with a single layer containing a sufﬁciently large number of nodes. The mapping
layer is the hidden layer of the subnet representing G, and the demapping layer is the hidden
layer of the subnet representing H.
Autoassociative networks require “supervised” training, where a desired output is spec-
iﬁed for each training example. One cannot train the network representing G by itself, since
the output T is unknown. Similarly, the network H cannot be trained separately even thought
the desired output is known (the target output is Ŷ ), because the corresponding input T is
unknown. Therefore, direct supervised training of each of these networks individually is in-
feasible. To circumvent this problem, the two networks are combined in series so that G feeds
directly into H, resulting in a network whose inputs and desired outputs are known. Speciﬁ-
cally, Ŷ uses both the input to G and the desired output from H. The combined network with
G and H in series contains three hidden layers, since the bottleneck layer is shared, being the
output of G and the input layer H, as shown in Figure 2.3. Finally, for classifying the data
into valid and invalid sets, the residual signals deﬁned as R = Y −Y ′ are generated , and the
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threshold values are then selected properly for each residual.
2.4 Data Preprocessing
Normalization is a “scaling down” transformation of the data. Within a data set there is often
a large difference between the maximum and the minimum values. When normalization is
performed the value of the signals are scaled to appreciably lower values. The two most
common methods for normalization are as follows.
• min- max normalization
x′= 2 x− xmin
xmax− xmin −1 (2.20)
where xmin and xmax denote the minimum and the maximum of x, respectively. This





where μ(x) and σ(x) denote the mean and the standard deviation of x, respectively.
This normalization produces a data set where each point has a mean close to zero and a
variance close to one.
Normalization should be applied to all the data sets before commencement of the train-
ing process. One should note that the means and standard deviations that are computed
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from the data must be retained and used later in the testing process for de-normalization.
Otherwise, the performance of the neural network will vary signiﬁcantly as it was
trained on a different data representation than the un-normalized data. The advantage of
the statistical normalization is that it reduces the effects of the outliers in the data.
2.5 Aircraft Jet Engine Mathematical Model
Gas turbine engines are used in many land, sea and air vehicles. The jet engine (shown in Fig-
ure 2.4) belongs to one type of gas turbine engines and is used to generate a high-speed jet for
propulsion. A mathematical representation of a gas turbine is fairly common and has been in-
vestigated by several authors in the literature [8,30,79]. Based on the available literature [8] on
modeling of aircraft jet engines, a Matlab Simulink model of the nonlinear dynamics of the a
dual spool jet engine is used in this thesis. The simulation model was developed by using ther-
modynamic, aerodynamic and mechanical relationships of each of the major components. The
model represents the functional relations that exist among the engine variables, such as pres-
sures, temperatures and gas ﬂow rates. The details of the thermodynamic relations reviewed
in this section can be found in [79]. Rotor and volume dynamics are considered in order to
obtain a nonlinear dynamics for the system. The engine components (compressors and tur-
bines) are modelled by corresponding performance maps which are adopted from commercial
software GSP [7]. In the following, brief explanation of each speciﬁc component and detailed
mathematical expressions corresponding to the engine dynamics are presented. A schematic
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Figure 2.4: A dual-spool jet engine [5].
diagram depicting the main modules and the overall information ﬂows and interdependencies
are shown in Figure 2.5.
Intake Duct
Intake duct is placed before the compressor and supplies the engine with the required air ﬂow
at highest possible pressure. The air velocity in the intake duct decreases when air reaches
the compressor. At the same time, the temperature and the pressure increase. In the engine
intakes, by assuming adiabatic process, the pressure and temperature are computed as follows,













Figure 2.5: The aircraft jet engine modules and information ﬂowchart and interdependencies
( [6, 7] and [8]).
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where M is the mach number in the air temperature and pressure. The inlet temperature ratio








A compressor in a gas turbine engine is in charge of providing high-pressure air to the com-
bustion chamber. The compressor behaviour, as a quasi-steady component, is determined
by using the compressor performance map (this map is obtained from the commercial soft-
ware package GSP [80]). Given the pressure ratio (πC) and the corrected rotational speed
(N/
√
θ ), one can obtain the corrected mass ﬂow rate (m˙C
√
θ/δ ) and efﬁciency (ηC) from the








θ ,πC) and ηC = fηC(N/
√
θ ,πC). Once these parameters are obtained,












WC = m˙Ccp(T0−Ti) (2.25)











Combustion chamber is the place in the engine in which the fuel is burned in the high pressure
air supplied by the compressor to raise the temperature. The rise in the temperature is due to
the energy released by the burning fuel. The combustion chamber represents both the energy
accumulation and the volume dynamics between the high pressure compressor and the high
pressure turbine at the same time. The dynamics inside the combustion chamber is governed











[(cpTCm˙C+ηCCHum˙ f − cpTCCm˙T )− cvTCC(m˙C+ m˙ f − m˙T )] (2.27)
Turbine
The function of the turbine in a jet engine is to extract a portion of the pressure and kinetic
energy from the high-temperature combustion gases for driving the compressor and acces-
sories. In a typical engine about 75 percent of the power produced is used internally to drive
the compressor. The remaining power is used to generate the required thrust [79]. Like com-
pressors, the behaviour of a turbine is represented by characteristic maps (from the software




the corrected mass ﬂow rate (m˙T
√
θ/δ ) and the efﬁciency (ηT ) are obtained from the per-
formance map, i.e. m˙T
√
θ/δ = fm˙T (N/
√
θ ,πT ) and ηT = fηT (N/
√
θ ,πT ). The temperature
drop and the turbine mechanical power (which is proportional to the temperature decrease in









WT = m˙T cp(Ti−T0) (2.29)
Nozzle
Nozzle is the ﬁnal component of a jet engine in which the working ﬂuid is expanded to produce
a high-velocity jet. The high pressure exhaust gas is accelerated in a jet pipe located between
the turbine outlet and the nozzle throat to come close to the ambient pressure and consequently,
to produce thrust. The nozzle exit temperature Tno is given by




















(J is the moment of inertia of the shaft and N is the speed of the shaft).
Volume Dynamics
The volume dynamics is considered to take into account the unbalance mass ﬂow rates among
various components. Assuming that the gas has zero speed and has homogeneous properties




(∑ m˙in−∑ m˙out) (2.32)
Now that all the components of the engine are described, we explain how the tempera-
tures, the pressures or the pressure ratios and the rotational speeds can be obtained from the
above nonlinear equations for each component.
For a low pressure compressor, the pressure ratio πLC is calculated from the volume dy-
namics between the high pressure compressor and the low pressure compressor as described by
equation (2.32). The rotational speed (N2) is obtained from the solution to equation (2.5) for
the spool that is connecting the low pressure compressor to the low pressure turbine. Accord-
ing to the pressure ratio and the rotational speed, the corrected mass ﬂow and the efﬁciency
are obtained from the performance maps, therefore the temperature rise can be obtained from
the equation (2.24). The same procedure is followed for the high pressure compressor. The
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pressure is obtained from the volume dynamics that is described by equation (2.26). The ro-
tational speed (N1) is obtained from equation (2.5) for a spool that is connecting the high
pressure compressor to the high pressure turbine.
Finally, the pressure ratio of high pressure turbine is obtained from the volume dynamics
between the high and the low pressure turbines, and the pressure ratio for the low pressure
turbine is obtained by using the volume dynamics after the low pressure turbine. The mass
ﬂow rate of the nozzle is computed as follows.
If condition (2.33) exists. the mass ﬂow rate can be obtained from equation (2.34),




























































Here, it is assumed that Pni = PLT and Tni = TM, TM is calculated from the energy balance in
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The input or the control signal of the dual spool engine is the power level angle (PLA) that is
set by the pilot which is related to the fuel mass ﬂow rate (Wf ) through a variable gain. The




70 i f PLA≤ 70◦
Wmaxf i f PLA> 70
◦
(2.37)
Corresponding to different phases or stages of the ﬂight (such as Take off, climb, cruise
and descent) the engine experiences different operating regimes, namely shutdown, starting,
idle thrust, acceleration, deceleration, cruise thrust, etc. In this thesis the fault diagnosis prob-
lem is addressed in the cruise mode when the engine is in its steady state.
The resulting engine model that is considered in this thesis has twelve (12) measurable
variables (refer to Figure 2.5) that are deﬁned as TLC, PLC, PHC, THC, N1, N2, PLT, TLT,
PHT, THT, PCC and TCC, where they represent the low pressure compressor temperature, low
pressure compressor pressure, high pressure compressor pressure, high pressure compressor
temperature, high pressure spool speed, low pressure spool speed, low pressure turbine pres-
sure, low pressure turbine temperature, high pressure turbine pressure, high pressure turbine
41
temperature, combustion chamber pressure, and combustion chamber temperature, respec-
tively.
As explained in Section 1.2, common component faults are modelled as changes in
the components efﬁciency and ﬂow capacity. In this thesis eight (8) component faults are
investigated which are namely,
• Low pressure compressor efﬁciency decrease
• Low pressure compressor ﬂow capacity decrease
• High pressure compressor efﬁciency decrease
• High pressure turbine ﬂow capacity decrease
• High pressure turbine ﬂow capacity decrease
• High pressure turbine efﬁciency decrease
• Low pressure turbine ﬂow capacity decrease
• Low pressure turbine efﬁciency decrease
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, an overview of the background material related to our work were presented.
Two different neural networks were introduced and the aircraft jet engine mathematical model
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A Multiple-Model FDI Scheme Using
Dynamic Neural Networks
In this chapter, the problem of fault detection and isolation (FDI) of gas turbine engines is
presented. A neural network-based fault detection and isolation scheme is proposed to detect
and isolate faults in a highly nonlinear dynamic system corresponding to an aircraft jet engine.
Towards this end, dynamic neural networks (DNN) are developed to learn the dynamics of the
jet engine. The DNN is constructed based on a dynamic multilayer perceptron network which
uses inﬁnite impulse response (IIR) ﬁlters to generate dynamics between the input and output
of the system. The dynamic neural networks that is described in this chapter is developed to
detect and isolate component faults that may occur in a dual spool turbo fan engine. The fault
detection and isolation scheme consists of multiple DNNs, each representing various operating
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modes of the healthy and faulty conditions. Using the residuals produced by the difference of
each network output and the measured system output a criterion has been established for fault
diagnosis of the system components. Various simulations are carried out to demonstrate the
performance of our proposed fault diagnosis scheme. In this chapter, it is assumed that there
are no sensor faults occurring during the component fault detection and isolation process.
Recently dynamic neural networks have been utilized and employed in achieving fault
detection and isolation due to their capability in learning the dynamics of nonlinear systems.
The authors in [40] have used a multilayer perceptron network embedded with dynamic neu-
rons for fault detection and isolation (FDI) of thrusters in the formation ﬂight of satellites.
A dynamic neural network is constructed in [54] for accomplishing the fault detection task,
and a static neural classiﬁer is then used based on the learning vector quantization (LVQ) for
the fault isolation task. The authors in [8] have applied dynamic neural networks that was
developed in [53] for fault detection of aircraft jet engines. Our proposed scheme provides an
integrated solution for both fault detection and isolation of jet engines in a single framework
using the dynamic neural network-based multiple model strategy. It will be shown that by
using a bank of dynamic neural networks the problem of fault detection and isolation of a dual
spool jet engine can be addressed quite effectively.
45
3.1 Dynamic Neural Network FDI Approach
In this section, a fault diagnosis methodology for a dual spool gas turbine engine is developed.
Towards this end, a dynamic neural network-based multiple model scheme is proposed in
which the bank of dynamic neural networks acts as an estimator or identiﬁer of different
engine operating conditions corresponding to the various but limited faulty modes that are of
most interest or possible in the jet engine.
The dynamic neural network-based multiple model idea is derived and motivated from
that of multiple model-based FDI schemes in the literature [6, 7], where the mathematical
models corresponding to multiple operating conditions are replaced by a parallel bank of dy-
namic neural network identiﬁers. The basic structure of the FDI scheme that uses dynamic
neural networks is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The proposed neural network-based multiple
model scheme requires training data on the healthy and faulty situations in order to learn all
the classes of the system behavior.
Note that for the purpose of only fault detection, the dynamic neural networks is trained
with only the data corresponding to the healthy condition of the jet engine. In this case learning
data can be collected directly from the healthy engine, if possible, or from a simulation model
that is as realistic and high ﬁdelity as possible. However, for the purpose of fault isolation
since the dynamic neural networks need to be trained for different faulty situations, such data
has to be obtained through high ﬁdelity simulation studies or over the life of the real engine
(the engine that has been deteriorated and the percentage of the deterioration is known).
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According to Figure 3.1, a bank of dynamic neural network models is needed for fault
detection and isolation purposes. The ﬁrst model (Model 0) represents the healthy system and
the others represent the corresponding assumed L faulty conditions of interest to be isolated.
The residuals are generated by comparing the jet engine outputs and the dynamic neural net-
works outputs. Consequently, when the residual r0 is smaller than an appropriately selected
threshold, the system is considered healthy, otherwise a system is considered faulty. For fault
isolation, unlike the detection phase, the residuals (r1,r2, ...,rL) are close to zero (or below
their thresholds) associated with the faulty condition. Indeed, a fault is isolated by evaluating
the residuals so that before the occurrence of a fault all the residuals would be above their
thresholds or signiﬁcantly different from zero given the healthy condition of the system. Once
a fault occurs, the residual for the corresponding fault model should be close to zero or below
a threshold and the residuals generated for the other fault models should then be above their
thresholds or signiﬁcantly different from zero.
It is worth to noting that in order to reduce the computational cost of the proposed FDI
system during the normal operation of the engine, it is also possible to just have the healthy
model active and once the fault is detected then fault models will be activated to isolate the
faults.
The jet engine component faults considered correspond to changes in eight (8) health
parameters which are the efﬁciencies and the ﬂow capacities of the low pressure compres-
sor, the high pressure compressor, the low pressure turbine, and the high pressure turbine.
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Figure 3.1: The dynamic neural network architecture proposed for performing fault detection
and isolation simultaneously.
Therefore, eight (8) component faults, as shown in Table 3.1, are investigated in this thesis
to be detected and isolated. Hence, a total of nine (9) models or dynamic neural networks
(DNN) are needed (L = 8), where each model represents and is associated with one class of
the jet engine behavior. The input to DNNs is fuel mass ﬂow rate (Wf ) and the outputs are
engine variables such as pressures, temperatures and rotational speeds. The networks DNN1
to DNN8 correspond to the component faults and the ninth dynamic neural network DNN0
corresponds to the healthy mode of the jet engine. Table 3.1 presents the associated network






ΔΓLC Low pressure compressor ﬂow capacity decrease DNN1
ΔηLC Low pressure compressor efﬁciency decrease DNN2
ΔΓHC High pressure compressor ﬂow capacity decrease DNN3
ΔηHC High pressure compressor efﬁciency decrease DNN4
ΔΓHT High pressure turbine ﬂow capacity decrease DNN5
ΔηHT High pressure turbine efﬁciency decrease DNN6
ΔΓLT Low pressure turbine ﬂow capacity decrease DNN7
ΔηLT Low pressure turbine efﬁciency decrease DNN8
Table 3.1: The deﬁnitions and descriptions of the considered components faults.
3.1.1 Threshold Selection Criterion
In order to evaluate the residuals and to obtain information about the faults, a simple threshold
selection technique which employs the statistical parameters of the residuals is applied. As
mentioned earlier, for the purpose of fault detection the residuals should ideally be very close
to zero when the system is healthy and should deviate noticeably from zero when a fault occurs
in the system. However, in practice due to modelling uncertainties and measurement noise, it
is necessary to assign appropriate thresholds larger than zero in order to avoid false alarms.
Indeed, in presence of measurement noise and system disturbances, the residual signals shall
remain in the vicinity of zero under healthy condition and diverge from the neighbourhood of
zero (i.e., exceed a certain threshold band around zero) when faults occur in the system. On
the other hand, by selecting the thresholds too high may lead to the FDI scheme missing low
severity faults. This imposes a tradeoff between reducing the number of false alarms and the
number of missed alarms (i.e., missing to detect the presence of an actually occurred fault).
Below a probabilistic threshold selection method is proposed as a reliable solution to
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this trade-off. Assume that the residuals are normal random variables expressed as
ri(k) = ε(k), k = 1, ...,K; i= 0, ...,L (3.1)
where ε(k) is a normal random variable N(m,v), with the mean m and the standard deviation
v, K and L denote the size of the data used for testing and the number of operating models,
respectively. A signiﬁcance level β is ﬁrst deﬁned corresponding to the probability that a
residual exceeds the value of the threshold denoted by Ti [75], that is
β = prob(|ri(k)|> Ti) f or i= 0,1, ...,L (3.2)
Standardizing 1 the normal random variable r(k) to have zero mean and a standard
deviation of 1, β is now written as
β = prob(|z(k)|> tiβ ) f or i= 0,1, ...,L (3.3)





1In mathematical statistics, a random variable X is standardized by subtracting its expected value E[X] (the





By specifying a certain value for an acceptable probability of false alarms (β ), tiβ can
then be found by using the cumulative normal probability tables. In this way, by assuming a
signiﬁcance level β , one can obtain tiβ and then the threshold Ti is selected according to
Ti = tiβ v+m (3.5)
The parameters m and v for each residual (r0,r1,r2, ...,rL) are empirically obtained
through conducting multiple Monte Carlo simulations corresponding to random noise of 100
runs of each input setting. The mean and standard deviations of the residuals in the steady state
during the healthy or faulty operation of the jet engine are computed for each run and then the
average corresponding to all the runs are considered as the mean and standard deviations (m
and v) for the residual signals of the bank of dynamic neural networks.
3.2 Simulation Results
The implementation of our proposed dynamic neural network-based fault detection and isola-
tion scheme consists of three main tasks, namely (i) System Identiﬁcation, (ii) Fault Detection,
and (iii) Fault Isolation. The implementation of these steps and the case studies are explained
and illustrated in detail below.
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3.2.1 System Identiﬁcation Phase
The performance of the system identiﬁcation phase plays an important role in the capability
of the overall fault diagnosis scheme. Three subtasks have to be performed for this phase,
which include (a) the data preprocessing, (b) architecture and training, and (c) testing of the
proposed dynamic neural networks.
(a) Data Preprocessing: The engine variables have various amplitude and ranges, and there is
often a large difference between their maximum and minimum values. Neural network training
could be made more efﬁcient by performing certain preprocessing steps on the network inputs
and targets. It has been observed that the training procedure is sensitive to the data normaliza-
tion method and after several investigations we have determined that among the normalization
methods discussed in Section 2.4, the max-min normalization process yields the best results.
Speciﬁcally, we employ the following operation on the raw data that is generated by using our
simulator, that is
Xn = 2∗ (X −a)b−a −1 (3.6)
where a and b denote the maximum and the minimum of the range of the signal X , respectively.
This normalization is applied to both the input and the output signals of the neural networks.
(b) Dynamic Neural Networks Architecture and Training: The training data are generated
from the simulation model of the jet engine, such that the engine input fuel mass ﬂow rate is
in the form of periodic triangular signal having a period of 2000 samples. Due to the high
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complexity of the engine dynamics, a large amount of data is required for network to learn the
dynamics of the engine. To adjust the weights and ﬁlter coefﬁcients of each dynamic neural
network, the so-called extended back propagation algorithm was used. The learning algorithm
is initialized with small random values for the network parameters (namely, weights, feedback
ﬁlters, activation function slope) while the IIR ﬁlter’s denominator coefﬁcients are initially set
to zero to ensure stable learning. The activation functions in the hidden layers are taken as
hyperbolic tangent functions, and linear activation functions for the output layer neurons.
The order of all the IIR ﬁlters is set to 2 since choosing higher order ﬁlters does not
necessarily lead to better performance while it increases the computational cost. Starting with
a relatively small structure, we developed an optimal architecture of our proposed nine (9)
dynamic neural networks in each bank of dynamic neural networks by incrementally increas-
ing the number of neurons in the hidden layers and also changing the learning rates for each
parameter until a desired performance speciﬁcation is satisﬁed.
In order to achieve the desired performance, ﬁrst the number of training data must be
large enough so that the dynamic neural network is able to learn the dynamics of the system
quite well. Second, the network update parameters (weights w, ﬁlter feed back parameters b,
ﬁlter feedforward parameters a, and slope coefﬁcient g) must converge to a certain value after
several iterations. Selecting an appropriate learning rate helps for faster convergence. Finally,
the performance (cost) index needs to be as minimum as possible for training and testing data.
Indeed the best structure has been selected by changing the number of neurons and selecting
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the structure with the lowest performance (cost) index.
Each dynamic neural network model was trained by using suitable data corresponding
to healthy or faulty modes. Subsequently, the performance of the constructed models are
examined by using both the nominal and the faulty data. We observed that having one hidden
layer in the network requires a relatively large number of neurons in that hidden layer to learn
the engine dynamics. Hence, we have used two hidden layers for all the networks.
The dynamic neural networks speciﬁcations for four trained variables THC, THT, PLC
and N1 that are representative of the system in the healthy condition (health model 0 in Fig-
ure 3.1) is presented in Table 3.2. This table shows the dynamic neural networks structure
(number of neurons in the ﬁrst hidden layer n1 and the number of neurons in the second
hidden layer n2), the updating learning rates parameters (ηw,ηa, ηb and ηg), the number of
iterations for each network and two performance indices for the training and the testing (JTrain





where yd(n) and yNet(n) denote the desired and the network outputs, respectively, and n is the
size of the training or the testing samples. Other dynamic neural networks corresponding to
the faulty modes of the engines have almost the same speciﬁcations as those given in Table 3.2.
(c) Dynamic Neural Network Testing: The representation capabilities of the trained net-
works are evaluated through generalizing them with another data set of 6,000 samples that
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Engine Variables n1 n2 ηa ηb ηg ηw # of Iterations JTrain JTest
PLC 1 3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 40,000 0.17% 0.35%
THC 4 7 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 60,000 0.1% 0.9%
THT 4 5 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 60,000 0.09% 0.2%
N1 7 6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 100,000 0.15% 0.7%
Table 3.2: Selected neural networks parameters used for representing the healthy engine
model.
were not seen previously by the dynamic neural networks. Table 3.2 shows the value of the
performance index JTest that is obtained during the testing phase. It shows that the selected
networks carry out the estimation of the output variables quite well.
3.2.2 Fault Detection and Isolation
In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed fault detection and isolation (FDI)
scheme, nine (9) sets of training data are generated, one set of data corresponding to normal
operating condition as well as eight sets of data corresponding to eight (8) engine compo-
nent faults. The component faults are simulated by decreasing the value of the component
efﬁciency or the ﬂow capacity by speciﬁc percentages. We have selected a 5% severity as a
typical level to illustrate the capabilities of our proposed FDI scheme.
It should be noted that by using only one or two output measurements it might not be
possible to isolate all the eight (8) faults and at least three (3) measurements, and consequently
three banks of neural networks are necessary. The structure of the neural network banks is
depicted in Figure 3.2. Any output measurement can be chosen to construct a bank of dynamic
neural networks. However, we have observed that different fault types and scenarios manifest
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different effects on the measurement variables. In Figure 3.2 four output measurements PLC,
THC, THT, and N1 that show better detection and isolation performance are depicted.
The faults are injected in the steady state (cruise) mode of the aircraft operation where
the engine transients have all settled down. All the analysis was concluded in presence of
noise. The measurement noise level was chosen to be twice the nominal noise at cruising
condition. The nominal value of the noise levels are shown in Table 3.3 where the standard
deviations are given as percentage of the nominal values at typical cruise conditions [28]. The
analysis has been conducted for input proﬁles in the range of 70% to 95% of the maximum fuel
value, as this is the fuel mass ﬂow rate input range for the cruise mode. The ambient conditions
are set to standard condition 2 and the Mach number is 0.7 as a typical Mach number in cruise
mode. Both fault detection and isolation are performed by using threshold selection criterion
that were explained in Section 3.1.1 assuming a signiﬁcant level of β = 0.02 (2%).
As an example the threshold for DNN0 network corresponding to the variable THC is
obtained as follows:
Since β is set equal to 0.02, from β = Prob(|z(k)| > tβ ) = 2Prob(z(k) < −tβ ) and using the
cumulative normal probability tables, tβ is found to be 2.33. The mean and standard deviation
of the residuals using the Monte Carlo simulation is now m = 2.61 and v = 0.14. Finally, the
threshold value is found to be 2.9 by using equation (3.5).
2Standard temperature and pressure (informally abbreviated as STP) are temperature of 273.15 K (0◦C, 32◦F)
and absolute pressure of 100 kPa (14.504 psi, 0.986 atm, 1 bar)
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The thresholds of each dynamic neural network corresponding to the four engine vari-
ables are provided in Table 3.4. In the following subsections, three fault cases are considered
in detail to demonstrate the performance of our developed detection and isolation scheme.
Figure 3.2: The multiple model architecture corresponding to the four speciﬁc or more bank
of dynamic neural networks.
N1 THT THC PLC
0.051 0.097 0.094 0.164





DNN0 DNN1 DNN2 DNN3 DNN4 DNN5 DNN6 DNN7 DNN8
PLC 0.014 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.015 0.009 0.015 0.09 0.015
THC 2.9 3.3 0.9 3.0 0.9 3.4 3.5 2.5 0.7
THT 8.0 7.2 3.5 8.6 2.7 6.7 5.7 0.1 6.5
N1 26.3 60.0 60.0 14.0 60.0 4.5 60.0 5.5 60.0
Table 3.4: Threshold values that are used for achieving fault detection and isolation.
3.2.3 Fault Detection Analysis Case Studies
Fault detection is conducted by using the model representing the nominal healthy operating
condition namely, DNN0. The residuals for this model should not be greater than the threshold
that is speciﬁed in Table 3.4 when the system components are healthy and should exceed it
under faulty situations.
(a) Fault Scenario ΔΓLC. A 5% ΔΓLC fault is injected at t = 16 seconds when the input
fuel mass ﬂow rate is at 70% of its maximum. Figure 3.3 shows the residuals that are generated
by theDNN0THC (corresponding to the output measurement THC),DNN0THT (corresponding
to output measurement THT) and DNN0N1 (corresponding to the output measurement N1). It
follows that the residual generated by DNN0N1 is above the selected threshold, however, the
residuals generated by DNN0THC and DNN0THT are not above their thresholds. This implies
that among these three dynamic neural networks, the network corresponding to N1 is the only
network that can detect the ΔΓLC fault with the selected severity level. The detection delay
time for DNN0N1 is 0.12 sec.
(b) Fault Scenario ΔηLC. The next scenario is a 5% ΔηLC fault that is injected at
t = 16 seconds when the input fuel mass ﬂow rate is at 80% of its maximum. Figure 3.4
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Figure 3.3: The DNN0 generated residuals corresponding to THC, THT and N1 for the case
of a 5% ΔΓLC fault.
shows the residuals that are generated by the dynamic neural networks. It follows that all the
three generated residuals exceeded their thresholds so that this fault scenario can be detected
with either of the three DNN0PLC, DNN0THT and DNN0N1 dynamic neural networks. The
detection delay time for the networks are 0.05 sec, 0.05 sec and 0.02 sec, respectively.
Figure 3.4: The DNN0 generated residuals corresponding to PLC, THT and N1 for the case of
a 5% ΔηLC fault.
(c) Fault Scenario ΔΓHC. The third faulty scenario corresponds to a 5% ΔΓHC fault
that is injected at t = 16 seconds when the input fuel mass ﬂow rate is at 85% of its maximum.
Figure 3.8 shows the residuals that are generated by the dynamic neural networks DNN0THC,
DNN0THT and DNN0N1. In this case the only residual that exceeds its threshold and remains
above the threshold is the one corresponding to N1.
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Figure 3.5: The DNN0 generated residuals corresponding to THC, THT and N1 for the case
of a 5% ΔΓHC fault.
3.2.4 Fault Isolation Case Studies Analysis
Single Fault Scenario
(a) Fault Scenario ΔΓLC. A 5% fault is injected at t = 16 seconds when the input fuel mass
ﬂow rate is at 70% of its maximum. The DNN1 network is representative of this fault (refer
to Table 3.1). It is expected that before the occurrence of the fault, all the residuals should
be above their thresholds and following the occurrence of the fault the residuals generated
by the DNN1 are below their thresholds. Other bank of dynamic neural networks should
then generate residuals that are above their thresholds. Figure 3.6 shows the residuals of the
eight (8) fault models DNN1 to DNN8. One can observe that this fault is isolated by the
bank of dynamic neural networks corresponding to THT and N1 networks. Note that only
these DNN1 residuals are below their thresholds. Furthermore, the bank of dynamic neural
networks belonging to THC is not capable of isolating this fault since the residual in this model
is not below its threshold.
(b) Fault Scenario ΔηLC. The next fault scenario is a 5% ΔηLC fault that is injected at
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t = 16 seconds when the input fuel mass ﬂow rate is at 80% of its maximum. The DNN2 net-
work is representative of this fault model (refer to Table 3.1). Figure 3.7 shows the residuals
corresponding to the fault models for this case. Considering the residuals that are obtained
from the THT bank of dynamic neural networks one can conclude that this fault cannot be
isolated by that bank of networks, since not only the DNN2 residual but also the DNN7 resid-
ual are below their thresholds. The same property also exists for the bank of dynamic neural
networks corresponding to N1, since other than DNN2 in this bank of networks, DNN4 and
DNN8 residuals are also below their thresholds. However, note that it is possible to isolate
this fault by using the bank of dynamic neural networks corresponding to PLC, since only
the DNN2 generates the residual that is below its threshold in this bank of dynamic neural
networks.
(c) Fault Scenario ΔΓHC. The third fault scenario corresponds to a 5% ΔΓHC fault that
is injected at t = 16 seconds when the input fuel mass ﬂow rate is at 85% of its maximum. The
DNN3 dynamic neural network is representative of this fault. Figure 3.8 shows the fault model
residuals for this case. In this case the fault can only be isolated by the N1 bank of dynamic
neural networks. Similar to the previous case study, the THT bank of dynamic neural networks
is not capable of isolating this fault since two of the residuals are below their thresholds after
the occurrence of the fault. Also, the THC bank of dynamic neural networks cannot detect
this fault since the DNN3 residuals corresponding to this bank of dynamic neural networks
never exceed their thresholds.
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Figure 3.6: The DNN1 to DNN8 generated residuals corresponding to THC, THT and N1 for
the case of a 5% ΔΓLC fault.
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Figure 3.7: The DNN1 to DNN8 generated residuals corresponding to PLC, THT and N1 for
the case of a 5% ΔηLC fault.
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Figure 3.8: The DNN1 to DNN8 generated residuals corresponding to THC, THT and N1 for
the case of a 5% ΔΓHC fault.
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A summary of the fault detection and fault isolation results are shown in Table 3.5 and
Table 3.6, respectively. Table 3.5 shows the fault detection results using DNN0 for three dif-
ferent fault severities of 5%, 2% and 1%. Investigations have been conducted for six different
input fuel ﬂow rates (70%, 75%, 80%, 85%, 90% and 95% of its maximum). In this table if
the fault can be detected in all the 6 input proﬁles with DNN0 bank of dynamic neural net-
works it is indicated by a
√
. As the percentage of the fault severity decreases, the ability of
the network DNN0 in detecting the faults for all of the input proﬁles decreases. Indeed, for
some fault scenarios DNN0 is only able to detect the fault in some speciﬁc input fuel mass
ﬂow rates as speciﬁed in Table 3.5.
Table 3.6 is prepared for two different fault severities. The results are obtained with the
bank of dynamic neural networks that are trained with the 5% fault. One can conclude for the
5% faults that the fault ΔΓHC can only be isolated by the bank of dynamic neural networks
corresponding to N1. The THC bank of dynamic neural networks can isolate the ΔηHT and
ΔηLC faults and the THT bank of dynamic neural networks can isolate the ΔηHC, ΔΓHT , ΔηHT
and ΔΓLC faults. Also, the PLC bank of dynamic neural networks can isolate the ΔηHT , ΔΓLT ,
ΔηLT and ΔηLC faults. Therefore, considering all the banks of dynamic neural networks, all
the eight (8) components faults can indeed be isolated.
However, concerning the 4% fault that the network was not trained for before, only
few faults can be isolated by the banks of dynamic neural networks. This shows that the
bank of trained networks with the 5% faults does not necessarily yield good generalization
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5% Fault Severity 2% Fault Severity 1% Fault Severity










√ √ √ √ √ ◦1 √ ◦3 √ - ◦1 -
ΔΓHC - - -
√
- - - ◦4 - - - -
ΔηHC





- - ◦2 - -
ΔηHT






















Table 3.5: The fault detection results.
(- or
√
denotes that one cannot detect or can detect a fault
◦1 denotes that one cannot detect the fault if the input fuel mass ﬂow rate is at 70, 75, and
95% of its maximum.
◦2 denotes that one cannot detect the fault if the input fuel mass ﬂow rate is at 70 or 95% of
its maximum.
◦3 denotes that one cannot detect the fault if the input fuel mass ﬂow rate is at 70, 75, and
80% of its maximum.
◦4 denotes that one cannot detect the fault if the input fuel mass ﬂow rate is at 85, 90, and
95% of its maximum. )
performance for faults that are corresponding to the 4% severity, and hence for faults with
different severities one would require other specially trained bank of dynamic neural networks.
3.2.5 Concurrent Component Fault Scenario
All the above results are obtained by assuming that faults do not occur exactly at the same
time or concurrently. It is highly unlikely that two faults take place at the same time i.e. at
each instant of time only one fault may occur in the system. However, the possibility of two
concurrent faults is not unlikely. To evaluate the performance of the proposed FDI system
for concurrent faults, we assume that two component faults namely ΔΓLT and ΔηLT occurring
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5% Fault Severity 4% Fault Severity
(networks trained for this fault severity) (networks not trained for this fault severity)










ΔΓHC - - -
√
- - - -
ΔηHC - -
√


















- - - - - - -
Table 3.6: The fault isolation results (- or
√
denotes that one cannot isolate or can isolate a
fault).
concurrently. DNN7 and DNN8 are representative of these faults, respectively. According
to Table 3.6, ΔΓLT and ΔηLT faults with 5% severities can only be isolated by the bank of
DNNs corresponding to the variable PLC. Therefore, only the residuals corresponding to that
bank of DNNs are shown in Figure 3.9. The DNN0 (healthy model) residual is under its
threshold and the other DNNs residuals are above their thresholds before fault occurrence,
which indicates the healthy operation of the engine. By occurrence of the ﬁrst fault at t=16
seconds the DNN0 residual increases and exceeds its threshold and the fault is detected. The
DNN7 residual decreases and stays below its threshold whereas other residuals corresponding
to other faulty models still remain above their thresholds. Therefore, the fault is detected and
isolated. However, once the second fault occurs at t=25 seconds the DNN7 residual exceeds
its threshold whereas the DNN8 residual remains above its threshold since the ﬁrst fault still
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exists. The other DNNs (DNN1-DNN6) residuals are above their thresholds for those con-
current fault occurrence (DNN1-DNN4 are not shown in Figure 3.9 due to the similarity with
DNN5 and DNN6). Hence, the only information that can be concluded is that the second fault
has occurred but the fault cannot be isolated. For the detection and isolation of two concurrent
faults, a hierarchical approach can be employed [7] which is not considered in this thesis and
can be treated as future work.
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(a) The DNN0 residuals.
(b) The DNN5 residuals. (c) The DNN6 residuals.
(d) The DNN7 residuals. (e) The DNN8 residuals.
Figure 3.9: Concurrent faults (5% ΔΓLT fault injected at t=16 seconds and the 5% ΔηLT fault
injected at t=25 seconds.)
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3.2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, a dynamic neural network-based multiple model scheme is proposed for fault
diagnosis of aircraft jet engines. Several banks of dynamic neural networks are trained where
each network corresponds to a speciﬁc faulty and/or healthy mode of the aircraft jet engine.
The presented simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed strategy. Our fault
detection and isolation results are summarized in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. In the next
chapters we develop fault diagnosis schemes for sensor faults and for the cases when the
system is subjected to higher levels of noise and presence of outliers.
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Chapter 4
Data Validation Using Autoassociative
Neural Network
4.1 Introduction
Performance and success of fault detection and isolation systems to detect and isolate compo-
nent faults are mainly dependent on the validity and quality of the measurement data. All the
measurements which are obtained from sensors in the gas turbine are subject to sensor noise,
biases, drifts and other sensor faults. Such sensor faults and anomalies cause deviations from
real values and can result in poor fault diagnosis. An autoassociative neural network, intro-
duced ﬁrst time by Kramer [77] is a useful neural network to perform data validation. It is
practical for both ﬁltering or signal smoothing as well as sensor error correction. It is therefore
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a helpful technique to improve fault detection and isolation task and also to enhance reliabil-
ity and robustness of the diagnostic system. As described in Section 2.2 in Chapter 2 such a
neural network is feed forward with a symmetrical topology structure which is constructed to
make the outputs the same as the inputs, and has a unique capability of characterizing the data
dependency of the input data.
It will also be shown in the next chapter that autoassociative neural networks (ANN)
has great capabilities for both sensor fault and component fault detection and isolation. As de-
scribed in Section 2.2 on Chapter 2, the ANN architecture (Figure 4.1) consists of two parts,
the mapping layer and the de-mapping layer. These layers are interconnected through the bot-
tleneck layer which is the most important layer in the ANN. The bottleneck layer compresses
the data into low dimensional representation, eliminates redundancies and extracts principal
components in the output data.
The faults in the gas turbine engine can occur during the operation of the gas turbine.
Due to the fact that faults affect performance and life of the gas turbine, it is necessary to
diagnose and correct them. However, it is important to note that in addition to component
faults, measurement noise and sensor biases are other sources of parameter changes in the gas
path of a gas turbine. In order to avoid false alarms it is practically important to validate the
data that are received from the sensors. Otherwise, noise, bias, or other sensor faults contained
in the measurement data would easily be mistaken for engine components faults, resulting in
misjudgement in the diagnosis of faults. Such a misjudgement can cause lots of ﬁnancial loss
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Figure 4.1: Architecture of autoassociative neural network where σ denotes sigmoidal nodes
and l denotes linear nodes
for mistakenly changing a part in a good health instead of changing a simple sensor that might
have less cost.
4.2 Autoassociative Neural Networks for Data Validation and
Faulty Sensor Correction
Autoassociative neural network is an efﬁcient method used to process the measurements or
sensor data before performing fault detection and isolation. Sensors in a gas turbine are prac-
tically utilized in harsh operating environments and situations such as high pressures and high
temperatures which generate high levels of noise or other undesirable effects that make the
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fault diagnosis problem a challenging issue. Autoassociative neural networks show a sig-
niﬁcant robustness in presence of noise and sensor faults. In this chapter the autoassociative
neural network is utilized for the following tasks in aircraft jet engine, namely noise reduction,
inaccurate sensor correction, ﬁltering outliers and sensor error correction.
4.2.1 Network Training
During the training process the weights would be updated by using backpropagation algorithm
so that the outputs are the same as inputs. The training data and also the number of neurons
in the bottleneck layer must be selected properly, so that the internal representation that is
developed by the network by assigning the weights, retains the maximum possible amount of
information.
The weight updating process should be accomplished by starting from a small number of
neurons in the mapping, the bottleneck and the de-mapping layers and gradually the neurons
are increased in these layers, however one should note that the number of neurons in the
bottleneck layer is less than the mapping and the de-mapping layers and the mapping and the
de-mapping layers have the same number of neurons. The important key to have an efﬁcient
ANN for data validation is to use the appropriate input data to provide a proper amount of
information to the network for learning and also the most important factor is the number of
the bottleneck neurons. A network with a better noise ﬁltering and lower input-output error
should be selected as the suitable network for use in the data validation problem.
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The weights and biases are updated iteratively until the overall network mean square
error is minimized and the output approximates the input as closely as possible. This as-
sures that the internal representation that is constructed by the network retains the maximum
possible amount of information from the original data set for a given degree of dimensional
compression that is represented by the bottleneck layer.
In this thesis, a network has been trained with the data that are generated from a Matlab
Simulation Model, however it is possible to retrain the network with the data from a real
engine with noise. Using the data with some level of noise as the training data causes a slow
learning and higher training error and less noise reduction. Knowing the fact that there are
usually accurate simulators, it might be more efﬁcient to ﬁrst use the data that is generated
from a simulator to ﬁnd the suitable structure of the network and then retrain the network with
the real engine data to adjust the weights accordingly. This procedure helps the network to
match accordingly with that speciﬁc engine properties. However, the data from the real engine
may contain noise. Therefore, it should be noted that the retraining phase must be terminated
before the error function is actually minimized to avoid poor network generalization. In other
words, in case of using the noisy data, the retraining time must be sufﬁciently long to provide
an adequate ﬁt and not to be too long to ﬁt and memorize the noise, therefore a trade off is
required to be considered.
Noise present in the data that is imposed to the input nodes is ﬁltered in the mapping
layer before the bottleneck layer. The reconstructed data are generated in the subsequent
75
demapping layers after the bottleneck layer. The percentage of noise that is removed depends
on the redundancy of the input variables. For removing bias the same procedure as in the noise
ﬁltering can be applied, however in some cases the network may not be able to achieve the task
properly. Under these cases a robust autoassociative neural network (RANN) is introduced to
improve the ANN performance [77]. Using RANN one may need to train the network in two
steps in order to be able to perform both noise ﬁltering and sensor fault correction. Therefore,
the training procedures contain the following steps. First, in order to improve the training
capability of the network, the generated data from sensors must be normalized to have values
between -1 and 1. Second, by using the clean and uncorrupted data (no sensor faults), variety
of networks with different architectures are trained among which the best network is selected
according to the best input estimation and noise reduction capabilities.
After selecting the network structure if the ANN performance is poor in bias correction
then as part of the third step, retraining is required to force the network to produce uncor-
rupted output values for inputs containing bias or drift errors. To accomplish this, the input
data must be from faulty sensor data but the output data correspond to the corrected ones.
Considering the role of the two sub-networks of the ANN, the noise is ﬁltered in the ﬁrst sub-
network containing the mapping layer and the bottleneck layer. This sub-network has the role
of compressing the dimension of the inputs where the redundancies and random variations due
to measurement noise are removed during the space dimensional compression of the inputs.
On the other hand, the role of the second sub-network is to re-transform the compressed and
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ﬁltered data to its original dimension.
Based on this fact, during the retraining process it is helpful to ﬁx the weights of the
post-bottleneck layers (second sub-network) and let the training process to only update the
weights in the ﬁrst sub-network [77] where the noise ﬁltering is accomplished. This implies
that during the retraining process only the weights of two layers need to be updated.
4.3 Simulation Results
4.3.1 Training of the Autoassociative Neural Networks
The sensor measurements that are used in the following study are TLC, PLC, THC, PHC, TLT,
PLT, N1, N2 and TCC. Another input to the network is the engine fuel ﬂow rate (Wf) which is
not normally directly measured and is the input of the gas path system. It can be obtained by
using the power level angle (PLA) which is set by the pilot (details are provided in Chapter 2).
The fuel ﬂow rate in this work can change from 70% to 98% as it is almost the range
for the cruise mode. The ANN structure that is used for the data validation of a dual spool
engine is shown in Figure 4.2. The training data is collected from the simulation model of the
jet engine. Both input and output data are normalized by using the min-max normalization
to be scaled in the range of -1 to 1. The number of neurons in each layer should be found
properly for the network training. Starting with a relatively small number of neurons for
the three hidden layers, an optimal architecture is developed for our proposed ANN. During
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the optimization processes (that is ﬁnding the optimized number of neurons for each layer)
the number of the bottleneck layer neurons are changed from 3 to 7 and the number of the
mapping and the de-mapping layer neurons are changed from 10 to 60 neurons in order to
obtain the best structure of the ANN. The number of the mapping and the demapping neurons
for all the architectures considered are the same.
Using the batch training method a total of 7000 data are utilized for each ANN input in
the training and the number of epochs vary from 30 to 60 iterations. The data are generated
for different engine input fuel mass ﬂow rates changing from 70% to 98% of the maximum
fuel mass ﬂow rates (approximate range of the fuel ﬂow in the cruise condition). The ambient
conditions are set to standard condition.
Among all the evaluated architectures, the results of nine (9) architectures are shown
in Table 4.1. The table summarizes the architecture, the training error JTrain, test error JTest
and the percentage of the reduced noise variance which is the average of all the output mea-
surements for different engine’s input proﬁles. The noise level was chosen to be the nominal
noise at the cruise conditions. The nominal value of the noise levels are shown in Table 3.3 in
Chapter 3. According to Table 4.1 the maximum noise reduction belongs to the structure #4,
however such a structure has a high training and testing error (JTrain and JTest) implying that
the network has not learned the input-output relationship as required. The next higher per-
centage of the noise reduction is related to the structure #6 with a training and testing errors of
2.15 and 2.33, respectively. The structure #2 has both the lower training and the testing errors
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but such low errors imply that the network has captured somehow the random aspect or the
noisy behaviour of the data. This is due to the fact that the percentage of the noise that such a
network can reduce is low.
In general the structures with 6 bottleneck neurons has shown better noise reduction
capabilities. Among the ANNs with 6 bottleneck layer we select #6 with the structure of
10-32-6-32-10 which has the average of 68.49% noise ﬁltering capability.
Figure 4.2: ANN structure for the gas turbine engine sensor validation.
The simulation results are presented in the following to evaluate the performance of
ANN for data validation including noise reduction, inaccurate sensor correction, removing
outliers and sensor error correction.
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# Structure JTrain JTest Reduced noise level (%)
1 10-29-4-29-10 2.46 2.59 8.5%
2 10-35-4-35-10 1.78 1.98 45.44%
3 10-47-5-47-10 2.13 3.47 33.06%
4 10-35-5-35-10 10.21 13.82 84.78%
5 10-30-6-30-10 2.098 2.04 59.51%
6 10-32-6-32-10 2.15 2.33 68.49%
7 10-41-6-41-10 1.91 1.97 38.14%
8 10-34-7-34-10 2.12 2.14 32%
9 10-49-7-49-10 3.55 3.82 16%
Table 4.1: Trained autoassociative neural networks.
Noise Reduction
Noise ﬁltering properties of the autoassociative network depend on how much the network
learns the interrelation among variables in its mapping and bottleneck layers. Therefore, it
excludes random variations due to measurement noise in the bottleneck output, and after the
de-mapping layer the network will yield "clean” corrected data. However, the level of noise
that is removed from data depends on the level of the redundancy among the measurement
data that is used in the ANN inputs.
TLC THC THT N1 N2 TCC PLC PHC PHT
ANN Inputs
Noise Level
0.49 0.17 0.28 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.31 0.33 0.21
ANN Output
Noise Level




84% 65% 89.5% 53% 70% 86% 60% 50.26% 20%
Table 4.2: The percentage of the noise ﬁltered by the ANN.
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Figure 4.3: Input and the output of the autoassociative neural network for noise ﬁltering.
The capability of the autoassociative neural network with the structure of 10-32-6-32-10
in ﬁltering noise for each input variable is presented in Table 4.2. The noise levels are deﬁned
in the form of percentage of the standard deviations at typical cruise condition. The ANN has
shown a signiﬁcant capability in removing noise for most of the variables.
Figure 4.3 shows the noise ﬁltering capability of the above ANN for the case when the
fuel ﬂow rate is at 85% of the maximum fuel ﬂow. The ANN output is the ﬁltered version of
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the input data with a signiﬁcant percentage of the noise reduction. In this case the nominal
values for the above cruise condition for TLC, THC, THT, N1, N2, TCC, PLC, PHC, PHT are
respectively at 443 K, 793 K, 1457 K, 8390 rpm, 11725 rpm, 1458 K, 3.64 bar, 20.9 bar and
5.57 bar.
Inaccurate Sensor Correction
The ANN is also capable of correcting the data from inaccurate sensors. Accuracy in sensors is
the ability of a sensor measurement to match the actual value of the quantity being measured.
Clearly, sensor accuracy is essential for success and reliability of FDI systems, However, over
the life time of sensors, they may encounter loss of accuracy.
In order to evaluate the performance of ANN for this type of sensor fault, sensor inac-
curacy is modelled by increasing the level of the noise variance. Figure 4.4 shows the results
when the sensor noise variances are increasing linearly from the nominal sensor variance to
the variance which is ten (10) times the nominal sensor noise variances. In this case, Ta-
ble 4.3 shows the percentage of the noise ﬁltered using ANN. The percentages are obtained
through conducting multiple Monte Carlo simulations corresponding to random noise and by
considering the deducted value of the noise root mean square (rms) in the ANN output.
Removing Outlier using the ANN
One of the major problems in gas turbine engines is the presence of outliers that may lead
to false alarms in the engine fault detection system. Such noise outliers need to be removed
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Figure 4.4: Input and the output of ANN corresponding to the recovery of sensor inaccuracies.










0.2 0.3 0.26 0.37 0.11 0.25 0.49 0.8 0.96
Percentage of the
noise ﬁltered
92% 68% 76% 65% 84% 63% 71% 56% 33%
Table 4.3: The percentage of the noise ﬁltered by the ANN.
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before conducting engine fault detection. As typical examples, random outliers are injected
to the temperature of the high pressure turbine, high pressure rotational speed and pressure
of the low pressure compressor with the level of 1% for rotational speed and 10% for other
measurements. The results are shown in Figures 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 which indicate that the
proposed data validation approach using the ANN is capable of removing the outliers that
may have occurred on the temperature and rotational speed sensors completely. However,
the ANN can only remove the signiﬁcant amount of outlier for the PLC. Table 4.4 shows the
results of applying ANN with presence of outliers for different sensor measurements. The
outliers are selected at 1% level of the nominal values of N1 and N2 measurements and at
10% level of the nominal values for other measurement signals. In this table
√
denotes the
complete removal of the outlier. Corresponding to the PLC and PHT measurements, the ANN
is capable of removing 86% and 47% of the outliers, respectively.
Outlier removal capability of ANN




Table 4.4: Outlier removing by the ANN.
Error Correction
Besides ﬁltering the noise, the ANN has the capability to replace the faulty data due to the
sensor faults such as biases and drifts with estimated true data. The ANN is also useful in the
sense that if one measurement is lost, the lost measurement can be replaced with an estimate
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Figure 4.5: Input and the output of the ANN corresponding to the THC measurement signal
outlier noise.
Figure 4.6: Input and the output of the ANN corresponding to the N1 measurement signal
outlier noise.
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Figure 4.7: Input and the output of the ANN corresponding to the PLC measurement signal
outlier noise.
from the remaining valid sensors. However, sometimes the ANN which was trained using
valid data acts poorly in correcting the sensor faults for certain input variables. In such a case
as proposed in [77] by using robust autoassociative neural networks the training set should be
modiﬁed by including false data. The network is then retrained with the data sets that include
sensor fault data in order to learn how to ﬁlter the false information. It is also recommended to
adjust the weights after the bottleneck layer during the retraining and only update the weights
before the bottleneck layer.
In this section, the objective is to evaluate how efﬁciently the ANN corrects the cor-
rupted data and also how much other variables that are from the healthy sensors are robust to
the changes in the faulty variable. Several simulations have been performed in this section.
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Figures 4.8 to 4.15 show the results of our evaluations. These ﬁgures illustrate the recovery
rate of the faulty sensor data as well as the percentage of the deviations for other healthy vari-
ables from their real values when there are different biases ranging from 1% to 100%. The
recovery rates and the deviation rates is calculated according to [81]
Recovery Rate= (1− |YANN −YTarget ||YTarget | )×100 (4.1)
Deviation Rate= (
|YANN −YTarget |
|YTarget | )×100 (4.2)
For instance, in Figure 4.8 the top plot is the recovery rate corresponding to the sensor
TLC while the bias was increased from 1% to 100%. The bottom plot shows the deviation rate
of the other healthy sensors in case the TLC sensor bias is changed from 1% to 100%. The
same plots are presented for the other sensors. The results show a signiﬁcant recovery for the
temperature and speed measurements, and acceptable percentage of recovery for the pressure
measurement. From the shown ﬁgures it might be concluded that for the low biases the per-
formance is smaller than the large biases, however one should note that as the percentage of
the biases increase, the deviation rate of the other healthy measurements increase undesirably.
The biases on the variables THC, PHC, THT, N1 and N2 have less effect and produce smaller
deviation on the other healthy output measurements which are from the healthy sensors.
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Figure 4.8: The sensor recovery rate and the deviation rate corresponding to TLC.
Figure 4.9: The sensor recovery rate and the deviation rate corresponding to PLC.
88
Figure 4.10: The sensor recovery rate and the deviation rate corresponding to THC.
Figure 4.11: The sensor recovery rate and the deviation rate corresponding to PHC.
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Figure 4.12: The sensor recovery rate and the deviation rate corresponding to THT.
Figure 4.13: The sensor recovery rate and the deviation rate corresponding to PHT.
90
Figure 4.14: The sensor recovery rate and the deviation rate corresponding to N1.
Figure 4.15: The sensor recovery rate and the deviation rate corresponding to N2.
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4.3.2 Effects of the None-Validated Data on Engine Fault Detection
In this section, we will examine the effects of the proposed data validation system on the
engine fault diagnosis system. Sensor measurements will ﬁrst be validated by the noise ﬁlter-
ing and error correction using the proposed ANN. Then the obtained validated data from the
ANN outputs will be used for fault diagnosis by using dynamic neural networks as discussed
in Chapter 3. Figures 4.16 and 4.17 show the effects of the noise ﬁltering on the performance
of the dynamic neural networks when the system is in the healthy mode but the measurements
have noise with twice the nominal noise level in the cruise condition.
Figure 4.16 is related to the case when the input fuel ﬂow rate is at 85% of its maxi-
mum and Figure 4.17 is related to the scenario when the input fuel ﬂow rate is at 75% of its
maximum. The DNN0 is a neural network which is the representative of the healthy operation
of the gas turbine engine and is used for fault detection. Figures 4.16(a), 4.16(c) and 4.16(e)
show the residuals corresponding to the variables THC, TCC and N1 that are obtained from
DNN0 subject to the validated data that are generated from the autoassociative neural net-
work. On the other hand, Figures 4.16(b), 4.16(d) and 4.16(f) show the residuals of the same
DNN0 which use the non-validated data. It is obvious that false alarms would be produced in
this case since the residuals exceed their thresholds at some points. Similar case exist for an
another scenario that is shown in Figure 4.17.
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(a) DNN0 residuals corresponding to
THC with validated data for the
healthy operation of the engine.
(b) DNN0 residuals corresponding to
THC with non-validated data for the
healthy operation of the engine
(c) DNN0 residuals corresponding to
TCC with validated data for the-
healthy operation of the engine.
(d) DNN0 residuals corresponding to
TCC with non-validated data for the
healthy operation of the engine.
(e) DNN0 residuals corresponding to
N1 with validated data for the healthy
operation of the engine.
(f) DNN0 residuals corresponding to
N1 with non-validated data for the
healthy operation of the engine.
Figure 4.16: Effect of the non-validated data that produce false alarms (when input fuel ﬂow
rate is at 85% of its maximum).
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(a) DNN0 residuals corresponding to
THC with validated data for the
healthy operation of the engine.
(b) DNN0 residuals corresponding to
THC with non-validated data for the
healthy operation of the engine.
(c) DNN0 residuals corresponding to
TCC with validated data for the-
healthy operation of the engine.
(d) DNN0 residuals corresponding to
TCC with non-validated data for the
healthy operation of the engine.
(e) DNN0 residuals corresponding to
N1 with validated data for the healthy
operation of the engine.
(f) DNN0 residuals corresponding to
N1 with non-validated data for the
healthy operation of the engine.
Figure 4.17: Effect of the non-validated data that produce false alarms, (when input fuel mass
ﬂow rate is at 75% of its maximum).
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4.3.3 Effects of Data Validation on Component Fault Detection
When component faults occur the interrelationship among the variables may change and be-
cause the ANN network has not seen all the faulty conditions during its training phase, some-
times the network outputs cannot exactly follow the changes due to the component faults but
it is still possible to detect faults using the validated data and invoke the beneﬁts of not misdi-
agnosing the sensor faults instead of components faults. Table 4.5 presents the fault detection
results of a bank of dynamic neural networks corresponding to the healthy mode of the engine
(DNN0) for three different fault severities (5%, 2% and 1%) by using the validated data.
Regarding the 5% severity, the networks corresponding to the variables PLC and N1
can detect all different fault types that are indicated in the table. The only fault type that
cannot be detected by the THC bank of networks is ΔΓHT . Furthermore, the THT bank of
networks can only detect the four fault types as presented in the table. As the percentage of
the fault severity decreases, the ability of the network DNN0 in detecting faults for all the
input proﬁles decreases. Indeed, for some fault scenarios DNN0 is only able to detect the fault
in some speciﬁc input fuel mass ﬂow rates as speciﬁed in Table 4.5.
Comparing Table 4.5 with the one presented in Chapter 3 (Table 3.5) shows that the bank
of networks corresponding to PLC, THC and N1 can detect more faults with the validated data.
Besides, one should note that the most important beneﬁts of using the validated data would be
to prevent false alarms due to the sensor faults.
For fault isolation using validated data and the bank of DNNs it is required that the
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5% Fault Severity 2% Fault Severity 1% Fault Severity
Faults PLC THC THT N1 PLC THC THT N1 PLC THC THT N1
ΔΓLC
√ √ √ √ √ ◦1 ◦1 √ √ ◦2 ◦3 -
ΔηLC
√ √ √ √ √


















√ √ ◦2 - √ √ ◦1 - ◦1
ΔΓLT
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ ◦2 ◦1 ◦1
ΔηLT
√ √ √ √ √ ◦1 ◦1 ◦4 √ - ◦3 -
Table 4.5: The fault detection results.
(- or
√
denotes that one cannot detect or can detect a fault
◦1 denotes that one cannot detect the fault if the input fuel mass ﬂow rate is at 70, 75 and 95
% of its maximum.
◦2 denotes that one cannot detect the fault if the input fuel mass ﬂow rate is at 70 and 95 % of
its maximum.
◦3 denotes that one cannot detect the fault if the input fuel mass ﬂow rate is at 70 ,85, 90 and
95 % of its maximum.
◦4 denotes that one cannot detect the fault if the input fuel mass ﬂow rate is at 75 and 80 % of
its maximum. )
ANN follows the changes in the data because of the component faults and only correct the
sensor faults. However, as mentioned earlier the ANN trained with data of healthy engine is
not able to identify the changes due to the component faults. Therefore, fault isolation with
dynamic neural networks cannot be performed using the validated data. In the next chapter, we




This chapter presents the results of applying autoassociative neural networks (ANN)to the sen-
sor validation problem in aircraft jet engine. The capability of ANN in validating sensor data
including noise and outlier reduction, sensor inaccuracy correction and sensor error correction
has been investigated in detail and large number of simulation results were presented. Finally,
the results of utilizing the validated data for fault diagnosis using dynamic neural networks
have been presented. It was indicated, however that by using such validated data dynamic
neural networks does not allow fault isolation. The solution for the problem of fault isolation
will be described in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Multiple-Model Sensor and Components
FDI Using Autoassociative Neural
Networks
In the previous chapter a methodology was proposed for data validation in order to improve
the performance of the aircraft engine fault detection system using validated data. However, as
mentioned the problem of fault isolation of engine faults under the presence of faulty sensors
is more challenging. Indeed, one autoassociative neural network which is trained with data
generated in the healthy condition is not adequate to validate the data for all the engine faulty
conditions.
This chapter presents the results of applying autoassociative neural networks (ANN) for
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both sensor and components fault detection and isolation. We propose a bank of ANNs to
diagnose sensor faults as well as the component faults while isolating them in a dual spool
aircraft jet engine. The proposed fault diagnosis methodology is an integrated solution to the
problem of both sensor faults and component faults even if both the engine faults and sensor
faults occur concurrently. The parallel bank of autoassociative neural networks proposed for
fault diagnosis can be viewed as multiple-model methodology.
5.1 Sensor Fault Detection Scheme Using ANN
After training the ANN using a backpropagation (BP) technique with a certain number of
training samples, the ANN captures the interrelationship among the gas path system variables
that have some degree of interdependence with each other. This make the inputs match the
outputs as closely as possible. Therefore, when non-faulty data is fed to the trained ANN,
the difference between the input and output of the ANN would be zero. When the data is
contaminated (a sensor is faulty), the difference between the input and the output of the ANN
will be non-zero. In this manner, the ANN approach can be used to determine the occurrence
of sensor faults.
Figure 5.1 shows a sensor monitoring system for a group of n measurements. In prin-
ciple the ANN maps inputs mi (i = 1,2, ...,n) to outputs, m
′
i (i = 1,2, ...,n) in such a manner
that mi = m
′
i.
As proposed in [55] and [82] when the ith sensor that is input to the autoassociative
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Figure 5.1: Sensor fault detection scheme.
network with the value mi is faulty as a result of sensor drifts or biases, the network will
produce m
′
i as a close approximation and estimation of the true value of the measurement mi.
The difference between m
′
i and mi which is the residual can be used as an indicator of that
speciﬁc faulty sensor.
5.2 Engine Component Fault Diagnosis
In this section, it will be shown that autoassociative neural networks can also be used to per-
form fault diagnosis in presence of sensor faults for a dual spool gas turbine engine. Occur-
rence of faults cause the changes in the health or performance parameters which will generate
changes in the engine measuring variables and the interrelationship among them. Therefore,
having only one ANN that is trained with the healthy data will not be sufﬁcient to estimate
the engine variables for all the healthy and faulty operations of the engine. Consequently, a
bank of ANNs needs to be utilized. Each bank of neural networks is trained with healthy data
as well as the corresponding faulty data. Hence, each network acts as an estimator of both
healthy and one of the engine operating conditions corresponding to the various but limited
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faulty modes that are of most interest or possible in the jet engine. Note that the fault detection
and isolation tasks through this approach will be accomplished simultaneously.
The same input-output variables as those used in Chapter 4 are utilized to construct the
ANNs based on TLC, PLC, THC, PHC, TLT, PLT, N1, N2 and TCC and Wf. As mentioned
in Chapter 3, the jet engine component faults considered correspond to changes in the eight
(8) health parameters which are the efﬁciencies and the ﬂow capacities of the low pressure
compressor, the high pressure compressor, the low pressure turbine, and the high pressure
turbine. Therefore, eight (8) component faults, as shown in Table 5.1, are investigated for
diagnosis.
Hence, a total of eight (8) models or autoassociative neural networks (ANN) are needed,
where each model represents and is associated with two class of the jet engine behaviour, one
faulty mode and the other the healthy mode. Table 5.1 presents the associated network labels
for each fault scenario. Figure 5.2 shows the structure of the fault diagnosis system that uses





ΔΓLC Low pressure compressor ﬂow capacity decrease ANN1
ΔηLC Low pressure compressor efﬁciency decrease ANN2
ΔΓHC High pressure compressor ﬂow capacity decrease ANN3
ΔηHC High pressure compressor efﬁciency decrease ANN4
ΔΓHT High pressure turbine ﬂow capacity decrease ANN5
ΔηHT High pressure turbine efﬁciency decrease ANN6
ΔΓLT Low pressure turbine ﬂow capacity decrease ANN7
ΔηLT Low pressure turbine efﬁciency decrease ANN8
Table 5.1: The deﬁnitions and descriptions of the considered components faults.
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Figure 5.2: The multiple model architecture for bank of ANNs for fault diagnosis.
After constructing the bank of ANNs, the residuals are generated for each output of the
ANNs by comparing the jet engine output and each ANN output. The following itemizes the
three (3) scenarios that may occur during the operation of the engine and for each case the
form of the residuals are described:
∗ Occurrence of no component or sensor fault: When all the residuals of all ANNs are smaller
than an appropriately selected threshold the system is considered healthy and neither
component faults nor sensor faults are detected.
∗ Occurrence of component fault: Once a component fault occurs the residual for the cor-
responding fault model (the residual of the ANN trained with that speciﬁc faulty case)
remains under its threshold and other ANNs residuals exceed their thresholds.
∗ Occurrence of sensor fault: The occurrence of only a sensor fault causes the residuals cor-
responding to the faulty sensor exceed their thresholds and this should happen in all bank
of ANNs.
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Considering the generated residuals of ANNs and the above described residual charac-
teristics one can isolate the component faults from the sensor faults.
5.3 Simulation Results
As in the previous two chapters the simulations are performed in the cruise mode of the en-
gine. The ambient pressure and the temperature are set to standard conditions and the Mach
number is set to 0.7 as a typical value in the cruise mode. The analysis is conducted for in-
put proﬁles in the range of 70% to 95% of the maximum fuel rate. Similar to the previous





, where yd(n) and yNet(n) denote the desired and the network outputs,
respectively, and n is the size of the training or the testing samples) and the generalization
capability for validating the data were considered. The data that is used to train the networks
are derived from the nonlinear model that is introduced in Chapter 2 and normalized to the
range of [-1,1].
The ANNs are used to carry out component fault detection and isolation as well as
sensor faults in the gas turbine engine. Common component faults are modelled as changes
in the component efﬁciency and ﬂow capacity. Eight (8) component faults are investigated
as shown in Table 5.1. Corresponding to each component fault one autoassociative neural
network is trained. Each network is trained with the healthy data (the gas turbine engine
variables) as well as the associated faulty data. The variables used for the ANNs are made
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up of nine (9) measurements (temperature and pressure of the low pressure compressor, tem-
perature and pressure of the high pressure compressor, temperature and pressure of the high
pressure turbine, the high pressure and low pressure rotational speeds and the temperature of
the combustion chamber) and also the engine fuel ﬂow which is considered as an engine input.
Considering eight (8) autoassociative neural networks corresponding to the component
faults for the fuel ﬂow rate of 70-95%, Table 5.2 speciﬁes each network structure and the
percentage of the noise that can be removed by each network for each variable that is obtained
from the sensors. The networks are trained with healthy as well as corresponding faulty data
with 2% and also 5% fault severities. Table 5.2 shows the signiﬁcant capability of the ANNs
in ﬁltering noise in the temperature and the rotational speed variables.
Neural
Network Structure
Percentage of the noise removed from measurement data
Networks TLC THC THT N1 N2 PLC PHC PHT
ANN1 10-33-7-33-10 86 57 75 47 54 18 50 19
ANN2 10-43-5-43-10 64 43 50 35 57 6 40 5
ANN3 10-47-6-47-10 73 74 79 48 36 1 58 51
ANN4 10-28-5-28-10 86.5 68 45 68 54 - 60 -
ANN5 10-33-6-33-10 88 65 81 59 79 8 11 17
ANN6 10-44-7-44-10 75 77 40 61 50 - 74.5 63
ANN7 10-42-5-33-10 76 73 63.5 66 61 10 61 15
ANN8 10-33-7-33-10 75 65 70 58.5 62 3 52 30
Table 5.2: The ANN structures and percentage of the noise ﬁltering.
For each ANN1 to ANN8, the residuals which are the differences between the network
outputs and the network inputs are calculated, and thresholds are selected for each of them.
Thresholds are selected using the probabilistic threshold selection method as described in
Section 3.1.1. Selected thresholds are shown in Table 5.3.
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Neural Networks TLC THC THT N1 N2 PLC PHC PHT
ANN1 1.65 2.78 4 55 13 0.0072 0.11 0.02
ANN2 2 3.5 4.17 26.8 16.3 0.022 0.07 0.022
ANN3 1.3 2.9 22.5 36.2 28.5 0.015 0.18 0.28
ANN4 1.3 3.45 4.17 19.83 10.67 0.008 0.05 0.009
ANN5 1.3 1.43 2.27 19.33 14.04 0.007 0.068 0.02
ANN6 0.28 1.019 8.11 24.8 10.5 0.0028 0.056 0.019
ANN7 2.06 1.56 5.34 31.61 28.1 0.01 0.13 0.034
ANN8 0.4 0.6 3.55 21.81 18.9 0.0035 0.063 0.01
Table 5.3: The selected thresholds for each ANNs output.
5.3.1 Sensor Fault Detection and Isolation
For sensor fault detection and isolation the ANN outputs are compared with its inputs and
from the generated residuals one can investigate if there is a sensor fault and which sensor is
faulty. The outputs from the ANN provide the reconstructed and estimated values of the non-
faulty inputs. If the input data is fault free, then the ANN output will be the same as the input
and the difference between the output and the input will be close to zero. When one of the
inputs drift or vary from the nominal value, the corresponding output will not track the input
and their difference will be non-zero and this will cause the residual to exceed its threshold.
A number of simulations are performed to investigate the performance of the fault di-
agnosis system in evaluating sensor faults and determining how the residuals change in the
ANNs outputs. Figure 5.3 illustrates a typical sensor drift case on the ANN1 where the drift
has a rate of 0.06% per second from the nominal value that is injected at t=15 seconds on
the inputs corresponding to the variables THT and N2. Figure 5.3(a) shows the actual biased
and the neural network estimate for the measurements THT and N2. Figure 5.3(b) shows the
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residuals between the estimated outputs and the inputs of the network for eight (8) ANN1
input-output variables. Both the residuals corresponding to the variables THT and N2 have
exceeded their thresholds after several seconds, while the residuals corresponding to the other
output variables remain under their thresholds. Figures 5.4 to 5.10 show the same fault case
for the ANN2 to ANN8 networks, and the same results are obtained for those network as well.
As another sensor drift case, it is assumed that there is a drift of 0.15% per second
from the nominal value on the PHC output, when the fuel mass ﬂow rate is at 80% of its
maximum value. The sensor reconstruction and the residuals corresponding to ANN4 and
ANN8 are depicted in Figures 5.11 and 5.12 (due to the similarity in results the other ANNs
are not illustrated). In this scenario only the residual corresponding to the PHC has passed the
threshold, therefore the sensor fault can be isolated. However, it is clear from the residuals
that there are also small deviations for the other ANN outputs. Indeed, when one of the
ANN inputs deviates from its true value, it may affect other ANN outputs. Depending on the
“severity” level of the sensor fault, other sensor estimates may or may not be affected by the
information of the faulty sensor. Simulation results have shown that a severe fault on a sensor
output (which is an input to the ANN) can create false alarms for other outputs due to the
network dependencies on a selected few parameters. However, the residual levels are lower
than that of the failed sensors.
Considering the above facts one can specify a minnimum and a maximum value of the
bias for which the speciﬁc sensor faults can be detected and isolated. Choosing the thresholds
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according to Table 5.3 and assuming that the nominal values of the variables are corresponding
to the case when the input fuel mass ﬂow rate is at 85% of its maximum, the minimum and
maximum biases for each variable that can be isolated are obtained according to Table 5.4. Out
of this range the sensor fault is detectable but the residual is not sufﬁcient to localize the faulty
sensor and isolate it as explained above. Finally, Table 5.5 speciﬁes the lowest and the highest
value of the bias that can be isolated for each measurement considering all the ANNs. Those
obtained by ﬁnding the lowest value of the minimum and the highest value of the maximum
biases are shown in Table 5.4 for each variable.
(a) THT and N2 sensor reconstruction. (b) ANN1 residuals.
Figure 5.3: The ANN1 sensor reconstruction and the residual error for the sensor drift fault
with the rate of 0.06% per second on THT and N2.
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(a) THT and N2 sensor reconstruction. (b) ANN2 residuals.
Figure 5.4: The ANN2 sensor reconstruction and the residual error for the sensor drift fault
with the rate of 0.06% per second on THT and N2.
(a) THT and N2 sensor reconstruction. (b) ANN3 residuals.
Figure 5.5: The ANN3 sensor reconstruction and the residual error for the sensor drift fault
with the rate of 0.06% per second on THT and N2.
108
(a) THT and N2 sensor reconstruction. (b) ANN2 residuals.
Figure 5.6: The ANN4 sensor reconstruction and the residual error for the sensor drift fault
with the rate of 0.06% per second on THT and N2.
(a) THT and N2 sensor reconstruction. (b) ANN5 residuals.
Figure 5.7: The ANN5 sensor reconstruction and the residual errors for the sensor drift fault
with the rate of 0.06% per second on THT and N2.
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(a) THT and N2 sensor reconstruction. (b) ANN6 residuals.
Figure 5.8: The ANN6 sensor reconstruction and the residual errors for the sensor drift fault
with the rate of 0.06% per second on THT and N2.
(a) THT and N2 sensor reconstruction. (b) ANN7 residuals.
Figure 5.9: The ANN7 sensor reconstruction and the residual errors for the sensor drift fault
with the rate of 0.06% per second on THT and N2.
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(a) THT and N2 sensor reconstruction. (b) ANN8 residuals.
Figure 5.10: The ANN8 sensor reconstruction and the residual errors for the sensor drift fault
with the rate of 0.06% per second on THT and N2.
(a) PHC sensor recon-
struction.
(b) ANN4 Residuals.
Figure 5.11: The ANN4 sensor reconstruction and residual errors for the sensor drift fault of
0.15% per second on PHC.
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(a) PHC sensor reconstruc-
tion.
(b) ANN8 Residuals.
Figure 5.12: The ANN8 sensor reconstruction and the residual errors for the sensor drift fault
of 0.15% per second on PHC.
Neural Network TLC(%) THC(%) THT(%) N1(%) N2(%) PLC(%) PHC(%) PHT(%)
Min - Max Min - Max Min - Max Min - Max Min - Max Min - Max Min - Max Min - Max
ANN1 0.3 - 1.27 0.3 - 8.83 0.3 - 29 0.59 - C.F. 0.1 - 16 - 0.47 - 2.4 0.44 - 0.81
ANN2 0.45 - 0.67 0.45 - 5.55 0.39 - 35 0.3 - 98 0.1 - 52.5 - 0.33 - 9.6 0.35 - 0.9
ANN3 0.29 - 0.79 0.38 - 10.72 2 - 51 0.46 - 80 0.2 - C.F. - - -
ANN4 0.29 - 3.4 0.43 - 12.7 0.3 - 37 0.2 - C.F. 0.08 - 15 - 0.2 - 2.9 -
ANN5 0.29 - 0.31 0.18 - 3.6 0.2 - C.F. 0.22 - C.F. 0.1 - 7 0.19 - 0.42 0.28 - 0.87 0.35 - 0.9
ANN6 0.27 - 1.13 0.13 - 2.5 0.76 - 7.11 0.28 - 60 0.04 - 7.5 - 0.2 - 0.8 0.2 - 1.08
ANN7 0.46 - 2.82 0.19 - 3.8 0.5 - 53 0.3 - 24 0.23 - 10.7 - 0.47 - 8.6 0.33 - 4.5
ANN8 0.3 - 4.97 0.1 - 10 0.33 - 7.21 0.2 - 89.4 0.16 - 49 0.42 - 1.3 0.3 - 3.73 -
Table 5.4: The minimum and the maximum biases (C.F. denotes complete failure, when the sensor
reaches its full scale value).
TLC THC THT N1 N2 PLC PHC PHT







Minimum Bias 0.27% 0.1% or 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.19% 0.2% 0.2%
Table 5.5: The minimum and the maximum biases.
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5.3.2 Component Fault Detection and isolation
Single Fault Scenario
To investigate the performance of the bank of ANNs in detecting component faults several
fault scenarios are shown in the following case studies.
(a) Fault Scenario 4% ΔΓHT . The fault is injected at t = 16 seconds. The ANN5 net-
work is representative of this fault (refer to Table 5.1). Figure 5.13 shows the residuals of
the eight (8) autoassociative neural networks. Before the occurrence of the fault all the resid-
uals are below their thresholds, and once the fault occurs the residuals corresponding to the
model ANN5 still remain under their thresholds whereas for the other ANNs models almost
all the residuals have exceeded their thresholds except for a few of them (for instance, all the
ANN1 residuals have exceeded their thresholds except the one corresponding to variable PLC
or among ANN2 residuals only the one corresponding to TLC has not exceeded its threshold).
Indeed what is required is that at least one of the residuals exceeds from its threshold in any
of the other ANNs for fault isolation.
(b) Fault Scenario 1% ΔηHT . The next faulty scenario is a 1% ΔηHT that is injected
at t=16 seconds. The ANN6 network is representative of this fault mode (refer to Table 5.1).
Figure 5.14 shows the residuals corresponding to the fault for this case. All the ANN6 residu-
als remain below their thresholds, while at least one residual has exceeded its threshold in the
other ANNs which implies that this fault is isolated quite successfully.
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Figure 5.13: The ANN1 to ANN8 generated residuals corresponding to the case of a 4% ΔΓHT
fault.
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Figure 5.14: The ANN1 to ANN8 generated residuals corresponding to the case of a 1% ΔηHT
fault.
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(c) Fault Scenario ΔηLT . For this faulty scenario for which the ANN8 is the represen-
tative as depicted in Figure 5.15, for 2% fault severity not only the ANN8 network residuals
remain under their thresholds but also none of the ANN6 residuals have the chance to exceed
their thresholds. This yields an inability to isolate the fault with such a severity. However,
increasing the fault up to 3% as depicted in Figure 5.16 ensures the isolation as the residuals
corresponding to the ANN6 have exceeded their thresholds for this fault severity.
(d) Fault Scenario ΔΓLT . The ANN5 is representative of this fault case. Figure 5.17
shows the residuals of the ANN5 for the case of 8% and 9% fault severities. It can be seen
that for the 8% fault severity the residuals are still under the thresholds so that this fault can be
isolated. However, in case of a 9% fault severity the residuals would no longer remain under
their thresholds and the isolation cannot be achieved. As mentioned previously, the networks
are trained with the data that contain the 2% and 5% fault severities. Therefore, by increasing
the fault severities the networks are not capable of correctly estimating the changes on the
variables that are caused by the fault. In order to isolate higher fault severities one should add
other fault severities data to the training data. This would clearly increase the learning process
and requires larger network structures with more neurons. Alternatively, one can construct
other banks of ANNs with these higher level fault severities.
A summary of the fault detection and isolation results stating the minimum and the
maximum values of the faults that can be diagnosed by using the bank of ANNs are shown
in Tables 5.6 - 5.8. We have injected the faults with different severities at different input
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Figure 5.15: The ANN1 to ANN8 generated residuals corresponding to the case of a 2% ΔηLT
fault.
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Figure 5.16: The ANN6 and ANN8 generated residuals corresponding to the case of a 3%
ΔηLT fault.
Figure 5.17: The ANN5 generated residuals corresponding to the case of a 8% and 9% ΔΓHT
fault.
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fuel mass ﬂow rates. Table 5.6 shows minimum faults that can be detected by each ANN
network which are not representative or were not trained with the speciﬁc faults. Indeed the
speciﬁed percentages are the minimum faults for which at least one of the residuals on that
ANN exceeds its threshold. Clearly there is no minimum value of fault for the ANN that is
representative of that speciﬁc fault, therefore a dashed line (-) is used in the table for these
cases. Moreover, Table 5.7 shows the maximum severity of faults of what each corresponding
ANNs can be representative of. In other words, this table presents the maximum fault by
which the corresponding ANN residuals would not exceed their thresholds.
Faults ANN1 ANN2 ANN3 ANN4 ANN5 ANN6 ANN7 ANN8
ΔΓLC - 2% 2% 1% 2% 1% 2% 1%
ΔηLC 2% - 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1%
ΔΓHC 1% 1% - 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
ΔηHC 1% 1% 1% - 1% 1% 1% 1%
ΔΓHT 1% 1% 1% 1% - 1% 1% 1%
ΔηHT 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% - 1% 1%
ΔΓLT 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% - 1%
ΔηLT 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 3% 2% -
Table 5.6: The minimum faults that are detectable by using each autoassociative neural net-
work ANN1-ANN8 (the minimum fault that causes the residuals exceed their thresholds).
Summarizing the two Tables 5.6 and 5.7, the minimum and the maximum faults that can
be diagnosed in general by the bank of ANNs are now shown in Table 5.8.
Concurrent Components Faults and Sensor Fault Scenarios
Given the fact that component and sensor faults do not occur exactly at the same time, it is
assumed that the ΔΓHT component fault with a 4% severity has occurred in t=15 seconds and
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Faults ANN1 ANN2 ANN3 ANN4 ANN5 ANN6 ANN7 ANN8
ΔΓLC 6% - - - - - - -
ΔηLC - 6% - - - - - -
ΔΓHC - - 5% - - - - -
ΔηHC - - - 7% - - - -
ΔΓHT - - - - 8% - - -
ΔηHT - - - - - 5% - -
ΔΓLT - - - - - - 5% -
ΔηLT - - - - - - - 5%
Table 5.7: The maximum faults by which the corresponding ANN residuals would not exceed
their thresholds.)
ΔΓLC ΔηLC ΔΓHC ΔηHC ΔΓHT ΔηHT ΔΓLT ΔηLT
2% - 6% 2% - 6% 2% - 5% 1% - 6% 1% - 8% 1% - 5% 1% - 5% 3% - 5%
Table 5.8: The maximum and the minimum faults that can be detected and isolated by using
the bank of ANNs.
after 5 seconds (at t=20 seconds) the THC has encountered with a 20K bias (5%). Figure
5.18 shows the residuals corresponding to different networks for this fault scenario. Due to
the occurrence of a component fault at t=15 seconds all the residuals corresponding to the
network ANN5 remain below their thresholds whereas the other ANNs have their residuals
exceed their thresholds which result in the isolation of the component fault. After 5 seconds,
due to the occurrence of the THC sensor fault, the only residual in the ANN5 that would
exceed its threshold is the one corresponding to the THC output, which makes the sensor
isolation task possible.
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Figure 5.18: The ANN1 to ANN8 generated residuals for the case of a 4% ΔηHT fault injected
at t=15 seconds and 20 K bias injected on the THC sensor at t=20 seconds.
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Concurrent Component Fault Scenario
Figure 5.19 shows the results for two typical component faults occurring concurrently, namely
ΔΓLT and ΔηLT . ANN7 and ANN8 are representative of these faults, respectively, therefore
only the residuals corresponding to ANN7 and ANN8 are shown. Figure 5.19(a) illustrates the
ANN7 residuals when a 5% ΔΓLT fault has occurred at t=16 seconds and a 5% ΔηLT fault has
occurred concurrently at t=25 seconds. Figure 5.19(b) shows the ANN8 (ΔηLT fault model)
residuals for the same scenario. The ANN7 (ΔΓLT fault model) residuals remain under their
threshold when the 5% ΔΓLT fault occurred at t=16 seconds and the ANN8 residuals exceeded
their thresholds, therefore this fault is diagnosed. However, once the second fault has occurred
the ANN7 residuals exceed their thresholds whereas the ANN8 residuals still remain above
their thresholds due to the fact that the ﬁrst fault still exists. The other ANNs (ANN1-ANN6)
residuals are above their thresholds for those fault occurrences. Hence, the only information
that can be concluded is that the second fault has occurred but the fault cannot be isolated. For
detection and isolation of two concurrent faults, a hierarchical approach can be employed [7]
which is not considered in this thesis and can be treated as future work.
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(a) The ANN7 residuals for the 5% ΔΓLT
fault injected at t=16 seconds and the 5%
ΔηLT fault injected at t=25 seconds.
(b) The ANN8 residuals for the 5% ΔΓLT
fault injected at t=16 seconds and the 5%
ΔηLT fault injected at t=25 seconds.
Figure 5.19: concurrent fault
5.4 Comparison of Autoassociative Neural Networks With
Dynamic Neural Networks
This section presents a comparison between the two proposed approaches, namely dynamic
neural networks and the autoassociative neural networks for fault diagnosis of the jet engine.
As explained in Chapter 3 by using dynamic neural networks approach each network is to
learn the input-output dynamic characteristics of the jet engine corresponding to one variable.
This is to decrease and reduce the computational cost. For instance, for the four variables
PLC, THC, THT and N1, four dynamic neural networks are trained.
On the other hand, the autoassociative neural networks are multi-input and multi-output
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networks with a redundancy between their inputs and output variables. For comparison Ta-
ble 5.9 shows the characteristics and parameters of the ANN7 and DNN7 (both are represen-
tative of the ΔΓLT fault) for three engine output variables (THC, THT and N1). The size of
the three DNNs corresponding to the variables THC, THT and N1 are 1-4-4-1, 1-4-5-1 and
1-7-6-1, respectively and the number of updating parameters are 78, 89 and 139, respectively,
which gives a total of 306 updating parameters. On the other hand, the ANN7 has the structure
of 10-42-5-42-10 and a large number of updating parameters which is 1359. The training and
the testing performance indices are also shown in this table. This shows that dynamic neural
networks produce a better performance, in other words, the dynamic neural networks quality
of learning the engine dynamics is superior to that of the autoassociative neural networks.
Network Characteristics
Dynamic Neural Networks Autoassociative Neural Networks
DNNTHC DNNTHT DNNN1 THC THT N1
Size of network 1-4-4-1 1-4-5-1 1-7-6-1 10-42-5-42-10
Number of parameters 78 89 139 1359
Total number of parameters 306 1359
Performance index JTrain 0.001 0.0008 0.0043 0.006 0.007 0.0016
Performance index JTest 0.0062 0.0032 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.1
Table 5.9: Characteristics and parameters of the DNN7 and ANN7.
In dynamic neural networks, there are more learning parameters for a single neuron
(weights, IIR ﬁlter nominator and denominator coefﬁcients, and the activation function slope)
and the updating algorithm, namely the “extended backpropagation” is a more computation-
ally intensive than the general backpropagation algorithm, however the networks have smaller
architectures as compared to autoassociative neural networks. Indeed, even though extended
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backpropagation algorithm is a slightly more complicated than a general backpropagation al-
gorithm, due to the size of the network the training process in the ANN is slightly more time
consuming than the DNNs.
By using dynamic neural networks approach, fault detection is decoupled from the fault
isolation task. Therefore, if one is only interested in the fault detection problem there is no
need to activate the dynamic neural networks corresponding to the isolation task, which can
reduce the computational load. In contrast, in the ANN approach the detection and isolation
tasks are integrated.
Comparing Table 3.6 (the DNN isolation results) and Table 5.8 (the ANN isolation re-
sults) it can be concluded that the DNN performs satisfactorily for the faulty cases with the
same fault severity as those that the networks were trained with. On the other hand, the ANN
approach is capable of isolating a wider range of fault severities.
Finally, the most important difference is that by using the ANN approach the sensor
faults can be isolated as well, and the ANN approach is capable of distinguishing between
sensor faults and components faults.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, a multiple-model sensor and components fault detection and isolation approach
was introduced for aircraft jet engine using parallel bank of autoassociative neural networks.
This approach provides an integrated scheme for simultaneously detecting and isolating the
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sensor faults and the component faults. Various scenarios including sensor faults, component
faults, concurrent sensor and components faults and concurrent component faults have been
presented to investigate the performance of the proposed scheme. A discussion on the simu-
lation results for each scenario is also provided under each section. Finally, comparison of the
two proposed neural network-based fault detection and isolation approaches are presented.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Thesis Summary
In this thesis the problem of fault detection and isolation (FDI) in nonlinear dynamical system
of an aircraft jet engine is addressed using two artiﬁcial intelligent approaches. Artiﬁcial
neural networks are employed in this thesis due to their great capability in identifying any
nonlinear static and dynamic function and their competence to cope with system complexity,
uncertainty as well as noisy and corrupted data and information.
The main challenge in FDI systems is to diagnose incipient and abrupt faults in complex
dynamic systems under the assumption that input and output measurements are affected by
noise or faulty sensors. In other words, the FDI analysis can be strongly affected by the
measurement uncertainty and unreliability. This thesis addresses three main problems in the
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jet engine health monitoring and fault diagnosis system, namely component faults diagnosis,
data validation and sensor fault diagnosis. Towards this end, two multiple model schemes
using two different types of artiﬁcial neural networks were introduced.
The ﬁrst multiple model FDI scheme was composed of dynamic neural networks (DNN).
This FDI architecture consists of parallel bank of dynamic neural network estimators which
are capable of learning the intrinsic dynamical nonlinear behaviour of the system. Each net-
work corresponds to a speciﬁc faulty or healthy mode of the aircraft jet engine. The DNNs in
this scheme were constructed based on a dynamic multilayer perceptron network which uses
IIR ﬁlters to generate dynamics between the input and output of the system. Dynamic neural
networks has a great capability in learning the dynamics of complicated nonlinear systems
where conventional static neural networks cannot yield an acceptable modelling performance.
In other words, such FDI scheme has a speciﬁc advantage in terms of making use of both the
beneﬁts of multiple model characteristics and the dynamic neural networks.
The second FDI scheme was achieved by using autoassociative neural networks (ANN).
A parallel bank of ANNs were proposed to diagnose sensor faults as well as the component
faults in the aircraft jet engine. Unlike most FDI techniques, the proposed solution simulta-
neously accomplishes sensor fault and component fault detection and isolation (FDI) within
a uniﬁed diagnostic framework. Autoassociative neural networks are feedforward neural net-
works that use the concept of nonlinear principle components analysis (NPCA) and are prac-
tical for ﬁltering or signal smoothing, data validation as well as sensor error correction.
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In both proposed FDI schemes, while each network corresponds to a speciﬁc operating
mode of the engine, generated residuals have been evaluated to determine location and time of
the fault occurrence, and all these have been accomplished in presence of measurement noise.
Finally, the two proposed fault diagnosis approaches were compared in terms of performance
and quality of results.
6.2 Suggestions for Future Work
A large number of potential future works to extend the current research can be envisaged.
Some of our plans for future research are explained in the following:
First, the extended dynamic backpropagation algorithm used for training of dynamic
neural network, may sometimes get stuck in unsatisfactory local minima of the error function.
Such issues can be addressed by using the methods that belong to the other class of global opti-
mization by using stochastic methods such as adaptive random search (ARS) or simultaneous
perturbation stochastic approximation (SPSA). This helps to enhance the quality of fault diag-
nosis by improving the quality of learning and identiﬁcation capability of the dynamic neural
networks.
Second, in this thesis the problem of fault detection and isolation has been addressed.
Identiﬁcation of faults is another essential problem in aircraft engines fault diagnosis. In-
deed, accurate identiﬁcation of fault severities is an invaluable asset for system maintenance
as well as development of reliable autonomous recovery procedures. In our approach using
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multiple-model dynamic neural networks, the identiﬁcation can be pursued by adding more
DNN trained for different fault severity cases.
Third, as another recommendation for further studies, fault diagnosis in other ﬂight
modes such as take off can be addressed considering the situation when the environmental
conditions are varying. Furthermore, employing adaptive or dynamic thresholds techniques
helps also for better quality of FDI. Adaptive thresholds can intrinsically capture the nonlinear
behaviour of the engine, thereby addressing the limitations of ﬁxed thresholds. Residuals
may change with the varying control inputs and dynamic operating conditions of the engine.
Therefore, using a small ﬁxed threshold may result in signiﬁcant false alarms, while using
a large ﬁxed threshold may increase the number of missed detections and isolations. The
adaptive threshold automatically adapts to the changes in the engine operating conditions and
engine dynamics to enhance the robustness and fault sensitivity of the FDI scheme.
Fourth another future development for advanced FDI techniques can be focused on in-
vestigation of fault diagnosis system in the case when more than one fault or combination of
faults occur. For our proposed approach for detection and isolation of two concurrent faults, a
hierarchical approach can be employed.
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